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THE FTC'S CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM





The conventional wisdom is that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
under President Carter's Chairman, Michael Pertschuk, turned the FTC
into a renegade agency which engaged in runaway consumer protection,
hamstringing business with excessive regulation to such an extent it be-
came known as the "national nanny."1 According to this popular view,
Congress ultimately was compelled to rein in the agency to force it to
return to the role Congress intended for it. The conventional wisdom
portrays the FTC under Pertschuk's successor, President Reagan's ap-
pointee James Miller, in very different yet equally immoderate terms.
Miller supposedly went to the opposite extreme, acting as the puppet of
the industry he was supposed to regulate by virtually halting the agency's
consumer protection activities.2
This Article demonstrates that the reality was far more interesting,
complex, and problematic than these generalities suggest. The story of
Miller's leadership of the FTC also raises important issues relating to the
* B.A., Dartmouth College, 1966; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1969. Professor of
Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author wishes to thank Georgia State
University College of Law for its financial support.
1. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE
OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 69 (1982) (indicating that the phrase "national nanny" had
its origin in a Washington Post editorial). See generally BERNICE ROTHMAN HASIN, CON-
SUMERS, COMMISSION, AND CONGRESS: LAW, THEORY, AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION, 1968-1985 197 (1987) (expressing this view of Pertschuk's chairmanship).
Pertschuk remained an activist after he left the Commission. See Jim Drinkard, Tobacco's
Big Bucks Fuel Fight, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 9,1996, at Al (describing Pertschuk as "an
anti-tobacco researcher and activist at the Advocacy Institute").
2. See RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY
CHANGE: A TALE OF Two AGENCIES 189-97 (2d ed. 1996). In 1996, Miller ran for the U.S.
Senate, with the backing of state party leaders and conservative Christians, but lost to
Senator John Warner, who received 66% of the vote to Miller's 34%. Thurmond, Warner
Survive Challenges, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 12, 1996, at 5c [hereinafter Challenges].
Catholic University Law Review
structure and operation of administrative agencies. This Article examines
the major consumer protection activities of the FTC during the years
Miller was chairman, in order to go beyond and behind these generalities
and to record what actually happened, to explore possible explanations
for why these events occurred, and to examine the lessons which one can
learn from this study.
This Article recounts the activities of the FTC during the Miller years
by examining those who served as commissioners and high-level staff
members, critiquing Miller's management philosophy, style, and plan, an-
alyzing the enforcement cases the FTC brought, and describing its regula-
tory program. This Article also considers the activities of "outsiders"
such as Congress, the courts, industry, and consumer groups. For the pro-
cess involved, the relationships which developed, and the productive and
acrimonious interactions which took place, are important to consider in
understanding and evaluating each activity. These elements of time and
process are largely ignored in examining legal events. Instead, scholars
often focus on the final results of agency action, regulations, and decided
cases. These final results are viewed within the perspective of a tradi-
tional doctrine3 or chosen theory and a set of assumptions upon which the
theory rests.4 In contrast, this Article concentrates on the process in
which the Commission engaged, over time, in deciding to take specific
action. Taking time and process into account enables one to bring into an
analysis many factors which otherwise would be lost. Several theories are
considered, but only in the context of the empirical evidence of that pro-
cess which has been gathered from the statements and activities of the
commissioners and top-level FTC staff.
It is important to consider time and process to appreciate the compet-
ing forces with which the new chairman of any federal administrative
agency must contend. The chairman typically has an established reputa-
tion and has publicly voiced views on the mission of the agency. More-
over, the President often has his own programmatic objectives and has
appointed the chairman in the belief and hope, based on the chairman's
reputation, that the chairman's ideology matched the President's and that
the chairman would lead the agency in the same direction as the Presi-
dent's program.5 The President, therefore, trusts the chairman to act con-
sistently with the ideological proclivities expressed prior to appointment.
3. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Empiricists and the Collapse of the Theory-Practice
Dichotomy in the Large Classroom: A Review of Lopucki and Warren's Secured Credit: A
Systems Approach, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 419, 425-26 (1996).
4. See id. at 426.
5. See DAVID M. WELBORN, GOVERNANCE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
141 (1977).
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A chairman who acts otherwise may feel he or she is betraying the presi-
dent's trust.6 One would be especially loathe to betray that trust if one
desired future appointments in administrations controlled by that polit-
ical party.7
Once in his or her role as chairman, however, a person is subject to
countervailing influences. The FTC, for example, is established as an "in-
dependent" agency.8 In structuring the FTC in this way, Congress obvi-
ously intended that the agency would not merely parrot the President's
views. Otherwise, Congress would have established the FTC as a depart-
ment in the executive branch. The chairman must decide how to respond
to criticism and pressure from various external sources, including Con-
gress, which controls the FTC's budget and can expand or restrict its au-
thority. Other external sources seeking to influence the FTC include
state officials, the press, the public, and the industry the FTC regulates.
Furthermore, a chairman acts within an institutional context. The FTC
has its own culture and bureaucratic structure which determines how
things get done.9 The chairman inherits a docket of ongoing cases and
pending rulemaking proceedings in which the agency has invested vast
sums of time, 10 energy, ego, and money. It takes tremendous determina-
tion and leadership to make substantial changes in current projects. One
reason is that changes likely will encounter resistance from commission-
ers who initially approved the projects and the staff who completed the
6. See id. at 142.
7. After the FTC, Miller was appointed Director of the Office of Management and
Budget. See JAMES C. MILLER, III, THE ECONOMIST As REFORMER, REVAMPING THE
FTC, 1981-1985 (1989). He continued his career in politics in 1996, running unsuccessfully
for the United States Senate. See Challenges, supra note 2, at 5c.
8. Congress defines the FTC's authority, approves its budget, and has oversight re-
sponsibilities. The Senate approves the chairman and members of the Commission. Its
power over the FTC is limited because only the President can appoint the chairman and
members of the Commission. The President's appointment power is somewhat con-
strained, however, in that commissioners serve staggered terms and a new President can
name his or her own chairman. Though Congress has attempted to veto an agency's rules,
the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress may not exercise such veto power. See Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
9. See James Q. Wilson, "Culture" and "Compliance," in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 269, 269 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1994). Mr. Wilson indicates that:
Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking
about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization. Cul-
ture is to an organization what personality is to an individual. Like human culture
generally, it is passed on from one generation to the next. It changes slowly, if at
all.
Id.
10. See Glen 0. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive
Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 247 (discussing the factor of time in explaining the advan-
tage an agency bureaucrat has over a political official).
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work. Agencies such as the FTC have a tradition of collegiality which
would be broken by possible confrontation resulting from radical
changes.11 The FTC's actions cannot be understood without taking into
account these external and internal institutional actors and forces.
It would be equally amiss to ignore the norms and values of the person
who led the organization, his or her particular concerns, and the meaning
he or she gave to the information the FTC interpreted in deciding pol-
icy." The leader can be especially influential in an organization like the
FTC which has broad discretion.13 Despite the many external and inter-
nal forces which resisted alterations at the FTC, or fought for reforms
which would benefit their interests, Miller sought to make fundamental
changes. To fully appreciate what he tried to do, it is necessary to under-
stand his perspective on the world and his vision for the FTC. This Arti-
cle describes Miller's initial vision and how closely he was able to adhere
to it. This Article also considers the significance of Miller's training as an
economist and the difference between an economist's approach and a
lawyer's approach to heading an agency.
In addition to describing the chairman and the events which took place
during his tenure, this Article explains why the FTC and its chairman
took the positions and engaged in the activities which occurred during
this period. Various theories are examined for the insights they provide.
As Professor Peter H. Schuck has remarked, "administrative law is con-
stantly searching for its intellectual bearings.' 4 Because "[e]ach agency's
behavior reflects its distinctive history, statutory scheme, policy problem-
atic, legislative politics, bureaucratic culture, judicial review pattern, pri-
vate interests, and specialized bar,' 15 no one theory can "capture the
institutional complexity and human drama of the administrative pro-
cess." 16 Consequently, this Article discusses the applicability, as well as
the inadequacies of several theories, including "capture" theory,' 7 com-
11. See WELBORN, supra note 5, at 10-12, 48, 135.
12. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, Making Policy in Regulatory Bureaucra-
cies, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 3, 11, 18 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds.,
1989) (noting that the "social constructionist perspective" on regulation requires examin-
ing the norms and values of the actors).
13. See id. at 18.
14. PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (1994).
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id. at 4-5. Schuck's remarks were made in connection with the difficulty of writing
an adequate law school casebook on administrative law, but his thoughts are equally appli-
cable to the difficulty of devising an adequate theory to explain agency action.
17. See Marver H. Bernstein, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions, excerpts
from Regulating Business by Independent Commission (1955), reprinted in THE POLITICS
OF REGULATION 80, 85 (Samuel Krislov & Lloyd D. Musolf eds., 1964).
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prehensive rationality theory,18 the social constructionist perspective,1 9
and public choice theory.2" As discussed in subsequent sections of this
Article, some theories more adequately explain events than others.
Finally, the Article explores several policy implications of Miller's ad-
ministration of the FTC. This study of the FTC provides insights about
the structure of regulatory and enforcement agencies and how these
agencies should make major policy changes. Issues explored include the
role of public participation, the preferability of the commission structure
over a single administrator, the role of the chairman vis-A-vis other com-
mission members, and the significance of being an independent agency.
To put the Miller years in context, it is necessary to examine the years
immediately preceding Miller's appointment, because so much of what
happened during his chairmanship was in reaction to that of Michael
Pertschuk's chairmanship.
I. TRANSITION FROM PERTSCHUK TO MILLER: FROM AcTIvIsM
TO LAISSEZ-FAIRE
A. The Past as Prologue: The Pertschuk Period
The FTC has long been a very "political" institution, as evidenced in
two ways. First, many FTC appointments can be traced directly to presi-
dential policy initiatives or the appointee's political influence.2 Second,
Congress has long taken a strong interest in the activities of the FTC and
has not been shy to inform the FTC of its disapproval through use of the
budget process 22 and legislative restrictions.23 Public pressure also has
had a profound influence on the FTC. A turning point in the FTC's mis-
sion occurred in 1969 after studies by Ralph Nader24 and the American
Bar Association 25 pointed to the failure of the FTC to aggressively pro-
18. See Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 12, at 7-10.
19. See id. at 10-13.
20. See Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44
EMORY L.J. 587, 624 (1995).
21. See REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLrrICS 36 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1982).
A 1976 study found that many appointments "'can be explained in terms of powerful polit-
ical connections and little else."' Id.
22. See, e.g., House Commerce Committee Advances FTC Authorization Bill With No
Amendment, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1078, at 343-44 (Aug. 19, 1982).
23. For example, Congress passed resolutions calling for the termination of the FTC's
Used Car Rule. See House Passes Resolution Vetoing FTC's Rule Governing Used Car
Sales; New Proposals Surface, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1067, at 1163
(June 3, 1982); Senate Passes Resolution Vetoing FTC's Rule Governing Used Car Sales, 42
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1065, at 1075 (May 20, 1982).
24. See REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLITICS, supra note 21, at 79.
25. See id.
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tect consumers. In reaction, the Nixon administration, under the leader-
ship of Caspar Weinberger, reorganized the Commission and embarked
on a far more active path.26 Congress also urged the Commission to be-
come more vigorous. For example, in 1975, Congress criticized the Com-
mission for being too passive and specifically suggested that the FTC take
measures in regard to children's television.27
Seen in this historical context, one must ask whether Pertschuk's activ-
ism was revolutionary or evolutionary. The conventional wisdom, which
views Pertschuk as the chairman who defied Congress by taking the FTC
down the path of increased activism against Congress's wishes, clearly is
wrong. Pertschuk was chided for his wide-ranging effort to promulgate
trade regulation rules, but most of that activity began when Nixon was
President,28 and it was Congress that had enacted the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,29 which con-
ferred broad rulemaking authority upon the FTC.3° Although Pertschuk
was vilified by Congress and others for his "kid vid" initiative,3' Congress
itself had recommended FTC action to protect children from television
advertisements.32 The conflicting messages may be more a reflection of
the election of a more conservative Congress than a principled objection
to the Pertschuk agenda.33 Moreover, Pertschuk sometimes was his own
worst enemy. Whereas Nader criticized the old FTC as somnolent, Pert-
schuk was perceived as arrogant.34 In addition, Pertschuk admitted that
he waited two years to try to build positive personal relationships with
members of Congress and their staffs.35
Pertschuk attempted to ride the wave of the consumer movement
which gathered steam in the 1960s and continued to exert its influence
into the 1970s.3 6 He was appointed by Jimmy Carter who, as a presiden-
26. See id. at 80.
27. See SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH
TO DEREGULATE 180 (1983).
28. See REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLICIES, supra note 21, at 80-81.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1994).
30. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 1, at 44. See generally id. Pertschuk attributed passage
of the Act to the popular recognition regarding warranty protection.
31. See REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLITICS, supra note 21, at 81-82.
32. See TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33. See REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLITICS, supra note 21, at 80-81.
34. See TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 27, at 151.
35. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 1, at 92-95, 98-99.
36. See ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE MAR-
KETPLACE, 28-30 (1989) (indicating that "[tlhe years 1966-68 witnessed the passage of sev-
eral key consumer protection statutes," and that "[u]ntil about 1976 consumerists were
highly successful in Congress").
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tial candidate, had promised to be a consumer advocate if elected.37 In
addition to Nader, the Consumer Federation of America and other na-
tional and local consumer organizations played important roles.38 Law-
yers employed in offices funded by the Legal Services Corporation were
responsible for substantial consumer victories.39 As Pertschuk himself
has acknowledged, however, it is not clear whether the activities of these
organizations ever actually reached the point where it is correct to speak
of a consumer "movement." 4 Moreover, the business community organ-
ized for political action and made effective use of political action commit-
tee (PAC) money to push for deregulation.4' Meanwhile, the public
became receptive to the contention that government had become too
large, expensive, and intrusive, and that government programs produced
insufficient benefit, and government mandated paperwork buried busi-
nesses.42 In short, Pertschuk was riding a wave, but the tide was quickly
going out.
B. Miller's Confirmation Process: The Economist Approach
Shines Through
James Miller's remarks to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation during the confirmation process provided an ac-
curate summary of his guiding principles throughout his stay at the
Commission. In addition, they raised questions about his intentions.
Miller was appointed by President Reagan, who, as a presidential candi-
date, promised to reform the FIC and other regulatory agencies.43 In his
brief prepared statement to the Committee, Miller quoted Adam Smith
three times." He said he "would require a fairly substantial benefit-cost
test before initiating particular investigations and initiating particular
37. See HASIN, supra note 1, at 16.
38. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 1, at 29.
39. See generally The National Consumer Law Center, Consumer and Energy Law: 25
Years and Beyond, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 27 (1992) (reviewing emerging issues and
strategies for protecting consumer rights).
40. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 1, at 10 n.8. Because of competing economic con-
cerns, consumer protection never had a high enough priority for a consumer movement to
be established. See id. In addition, consumers are dispersed throughout the country and
most live far from the government agencies that engage in rulemaking. See id. at 133. In
contrast, business can organize to influence these agencies.
41. See id. at 50, 57, 62.
42. See REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLITICS, supra note 21, at 19.
43. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 2.
44. See Hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on
Nominations of Dr. James C. Miller III, To Be Chairman, Federal Trade Commission; and
Dr. Robert G. Dederick, To Be Assistant Secretary of Commerce, 97th Cong. 2-4 (1981)
[hereinafter Miller Hearings].
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rulemaking proceedings. It would be a fairly subjective test, I realize, in
many instances. '45 In the area of unfair advertising, he said he would
concentrate on deception and fraud, but he did not want to stop the flow
of information just because "a few gullible people might be deceived.,
46
He took advantage of the pre-hearing questions submitted by the minor-
ity committee members to criticize the work of the FTC under Pertschuk.
He felt the Commission had spent too much of its resources adding costly
regulation when it should have used cases and rules to "reinforce market
forces. '47 In addition, the FTC had been "overly adversarial" to the busi-
nesses affected by its actions.48 He voiced reservations about the Com-
mission's advertising substantiation program. 9 Finally, he believed the
FTC had applied its definition of unfairness in a way that created uncer-
tainty and did not factor in market forces.50 He recommended the use of
economic analysis to improve the lot of consumers.51
Mark Green, then President of The Democracy Project, testified
against the nomination.52 He faulted Miller's tendency to criticize gov-
ernment rather than business. 3 He pointed to the Reagan transition
team report on the FTC which Miller chaired. 4 According to Green, the
report criticized FTC economists for identifying market imperfections,
saying that instead they should be finding imperfections in government
regulation.5 5 In regard to cost-benefit analysis, Green feared that under
Miller, the FTC would overstate costs and undervalue benefits that could
not be measured.56
The Senate confirmed Miller's nomination in September 1981. Senator
Metzenbaum opined that Miller did not believe in the mission of the
FTC.57 He voiced the fear that Miller believed everything business does
45. Id. at 5. Professor Ernest Gellhorn, an advocate of using cost-benefit analysis in
FTC proceedings, also admits that the analysis is subjective and its calculations are, at best,
"crude guesses." Ernest Gellhorn, Trading Stamps, S & H; and the FTC's Unfairness Doc-
trine, 1983 DUKE L.J. 903, 957.
46. Miller Hearings, supra note 44, at 6.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 21.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 22.
52. See id. at 23-25. He stated that his testimony was made in conjunction with Ralph
Nader. See id. at 23.
53. See id.
54. See Miller Gains Confirmation to FTC: Senators Attack Enforcement Program, 41
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1032, at A-1 (Sept. 24, 1981).
55. See id. at 23.
56. See id. at 25.
57. See id.
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is efficient, and would lead the FTC back to adherence to the principle of
caveat emptor.
58
Miller's statements during the confirmation process were troublesome
for several reasons. He advocated the use of an economic approach in
general and cost-benefit analysis in particular, but acknowledged that
such an analysis would be applied in a subjective manner. Later, he justi-
fied applying an economic approach as superior to the ethical standards
he believed guided previous actions.59 He also accused the former FTC
of being governed "by unbridled discretion exercised by fallible and
sometimes unpredictable individuals" that led to incoherent enforcement
policies.6" According to Miller, a better approach was "to promote con-
sumer welfare by protecting and promoting the functioning of mar-
kets."-61 The economic approach advocated by Miller gave "one a sense
of limits and provide[d] much better standards for judgment and evalua-
tion."62 These later statements contrasted sharply with his admission at
the confirmation hearing that economic analysis, as with any method used
by fallible and sometimes unpredictable individuals, ultimately contains a
heavy dose of subjectivity. Perhaps all Miller meant to say was that a
person has somewhat less discretion when being forced to justify deci-
sions using economic analysis. Nonetheless, his statements provided
grounds for Mark Green's concerns regarding the application of cost-ben-
efit analysis.
When the Confirmation Committee asked whether the FTC had au-
thority to regulate unfair advertising, Miller's initial answer was "I am not
an attorney." 63 He then went on to say, however, that his focus would be
on deception and fraud. By this answer, Miller apparently tried to con-
vey the message that regardless of whether the FTC had the authority to
regulate unfair advertising, he would ignore that authority. Instead, he
would concentrate on deception, which is an entirely distinct legal basis
from unfairness under section 5 of the FTC Act,64 and fraud, which is a
common law cause of action.
Although the Confirmation Committee members did not question
Miller further on this point, Miller's implications that he would not focus
on unfair acts or practices are significant. Such implications give
credence to Senator Metzenbaum's charge that Miller did not believe in
58. See id. at 24.
59. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 25.
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 24-25.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Miller Hearings, supra note 44, at 6.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994).
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the mission of the FTC because Congress specifically directed the FTC to
investigate the market for evidence of unfair practices.
Miller was true to his word. Rather than using the unfairness standard
as a basis for regulatory and adjudicatory actions, he demonstrated his
hostility toward the standard by urging Congress to redefine unfair prac-
tices,65 an effort that ultimately failed.66 Miller also said he would con-
centrate on fraud. This focus was consistent with his view, 67 and that of
other law and economics advocates,68 that the common law offered the
best legal approach to promoting an efficient market.
In vowing to concentrate on fraud and deception, Miller added a signif-
icant caveat. He greatly valued the flow of useful information to consum-
ers, and did not want to enforce the law in any way that the flow would be
lessened in order to protect "a few gullible people" who might be
deceived.69 Miller's efforts were consistent with the law and economics
view that if most consumers in a targeted market possess adequate infor-
mation, the government need not regulate that market.7 °
Miller criticized the FTC for being "overly adversarial.",71 In opposing
the adversarial relationship, Miller indicated that he intended to start
talking to the regulated businesses. Did this mean Miller questioned the
validity of the capture theory? Did it mean he believed it appropriate for
the regulator to be in a cooperative relationship with those it regulated?
Notable in its absence was any mention of nurturing the FTC's relation-
ship with consumers or their organizations. Miller's statement and its im-
plications provided grounds for Mark Green's charge that Miller's
65. See FTC Letter to Senate Committee Takes Stand on Unfairness, Professional
Groups, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1055, at 528 (Mar. 11, 1982); FTC's
Letter to Senate Subcommittees on Bill to Restrict Agency's Jurisdiction over Professionals
and Unfair Acts or Practices, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1055, at 568
(Mar. 11, 1982); Miller Expects to Make Recommendations for Revising Federal Trade
Commission Act, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1049, at 234 (Jan. 28, 1982)
[hereinafter Revising Federal Trade Commission Act].
66. See infra notes 276-91 and accompanying text.
67. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 11, 13.
68. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 347 (3d ed. 1986).
69. Miller Hearings, supra note 44, at 6.
70. See POSNER, supra note 68, at 96-100. It also might have been a harbinger of
Miller's later revision of the standards for applying deception. See infra notes 174-78 and
accompanying text.
71. Miller Hearings, supra note 44, at 19. This adversarial relationship, which led to
FTC staff refusing to speak to industry, actually began prior to Pertschuk's appointment. It
was a reaction to the charge that the FTC was too cozy with those businesses it was sup-
posed to regulate. This phenomenon is so common it has spawned its own conceptual
framework and is known as "capture theory" because the regulated industry is said to
capture the regulators. See Bernstein, supra note 17, at 85.
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interest was in attacking government regulation, but not in attacking busi-
ness abuses.
72
Miller's training as an economist was significant. His economic back-
ground likely influenced his view that the best way to protect consumers
was to promote "the functioning of markets, 73 his skepticism regarding
the gullibility of consumers, and his penchant for cost-benefit analysis.
Additionally, an economist's approach to problems is fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of a lawyer. Lawyers customarily work within the con-
text of reacting to complaints and consequently adopt strategies that "are
reactive, concrete, and particularistic. ' '74 In formulating policy, a lawyer's
main concern is to draft a policy that will withstand legal challenge.75
Economists are more concerned with the structure of the consumer econ-
omy and "prefer a more abstract, proactive approach involving compre-
hensive planning and policy analysis."76 President Reagan's decision to
appoint an economist rather than a lawyer, therefore, signalled an appar-
ent intention to change the perspective from which the FTC would view
its mission. Miller's appointment raises the issue of whether Congress
should be more specific in defining that mission so it is not subject to
radically different interpretations depending upon the professional back-
ground of the chairman.
C. Theoretical Concepts: Espousal of the Comprehensive
Rationality Theory
Miller's training also made him amenable to determining policy in a
fashion more consistent with "comprehensive rationality" than other the-
oretical concepts. According to this theory, an agency decides policy by
"specify[ing] the goals of policy... select[ing] and evaluat[ing] alternative
methods of regulatory intervention, and... weigh[ing] the costs and ben-
efits of various programs. '7 7 This approach has been characterized as
72. A few months later, Miller seemed to espouse his own unique view of the capture
theory. He stated, "The last thing I want to do is to be captured by the agency or by the
agency's constituency." Revising Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 65, at 235.
This statement does not make clear who Miller thought the agency's constituency was. If
this statement meant the industry regulated by the agency, then that part of Miller's state-
ment is consistent with the capture theory. Miller, however, also did not want to be cap-
tured by the "agency," the FTC. Presumably, by this he meant he did not want to become
trapped by the FTC's history, culture, and bureaucracy. To the contrary, as discussed be-
low, he intended to implement substantial changes in the way the FTC conducted its busi-
ness. Id.
73. MILLER, supra note 7, at 24-25.
74. Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 12, at 21.
75. See id. at 21-22.
76. Id. at 21.
77. Id. at 7.
1997]
Catholic University Law Review
"rational, empirically based policy analysis."'T In contrast, the capture
theory contends that an agency adopts policies favorable to the industries
regulated by the agency because the industry heavily influences the
agency. Miller's response to the capture theory was to vow that he would
not be captured by the FTC's constituency. This could be interpreted as a
rejection of any notion that the capture theory would apply to the FTC
under his leadership. By urging the FTC to end its adversarial relation-
ship with those industries, however, Miller raised fears that the capture
theory would correctly describe the FTC's conduct under his
chairmanship.
Miller also promised not to be captured by the agency itself. This is a
reflection of his determination not to decide policy in a manner consistent
with the "social constructionist" theory. According to the "social con-
structionist" theory, "policymaking is a social process, in which actors in-
terpret their environments, their goals, and the constraints in the process.
Shared meanings arise through interaction among officials . . . and be-
tween these officials, interest groups, and other actors involved in the reg-
ulatory process, such as the courts and the legislature., 79 This social
interaction is a dynamic process which continues over time, leading
agency officials to continually reinterpret the meaning of the information
used in formulating policy ° because that meaning is influenced by the
differing norms and values of the actors, 81 the bureaucratic setting in
which the interaction occurs,82 and the competing pressures exerted by
the various publics with which the agency interacts.83 This theory is con-
sistent with agency policies that encourage collegiality among the com-
missioners and public participation in policymaking.
The social constructionist theory sharply contrasts with the comprehen-
sive rationality theory, which assumes that agency officials should be im-
mune to the influence of interaction, and that policy can be decided solely
by means of objective, neutral, data-driven analysis. Individuals running
an agency consistent with the comprehensive rationality theory tend to
disfavor public participation because giving heed to what public partici-
78. Barry Boyer, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection Policy: A
Postmortem Examination, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 93, 116 (Keith Hawkins &
John M. Thomas eds., 1989). Boyer points out that in the consumer protection area, it is
often very difficult to obtain the quantity and quality of empirical data necessary to sup-
port a policy based on empirical data alone. See id. Thus, relying solely on this data to
support a policy amounts to adopting a device to defeat policy initiatives. See id.
79. Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 12, at 7.
80. See id. at 11.
81. See id. at 16.
82. See id. at 12.
83. See id. at 17.
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pants urge leads to accommodating conflicting values, rather than objec-
tively and systematically evaluating alternatives.8 4 Public participation,
moreover, is viewed as an element of "incrementalism. '' 85 Incremental-
ism is a term for policymaking in which officials consider several compet-
ing values, "decisionmaking is fragmented and decentralized ... strategy
is remedial and ad hoc . . .conflicts of value are accommodated, and
policy goals are adjusted to reflect diverse political interests., 8 6 As de-
scribed below, Miller quickly adopted a centralized management style
and did not favor either management or policymaking by accommoda-
tion. He discovered, however, that achieving goals in an agency setting
requires social interaction and a certain amount of accommodation.
D. Early Statements and Actions
Soon after taking office, Miller's statements and actions revealed his
commitment to making substantial changes at the FTC. While assuring
FTC staff that he did not intend to "gut" the agency, Miller told them to
be less adversarial with the business community.87 He then began to as-
semble his team, most of whom had economics backgrounds and came
from universities with reputations for free market economics.88 Most no-
tably, Timothy Muris was named to head the Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection. He was a professor of law and economics who coauthored and
coedited a book critical of the FTC under Pertschuk.89
At a press conference on September 26, 1981, three weeks after assum-
ing his post, Miller continued some of the themes he voiced during the
confirmation process. He said he "'may well"' recommend changes in the
FTC's advertisement substantiation program. 90 He expressed skepticism
about the degree of the public's gullibility and noted that the cost of sub-
stantiation studies are passed on to consumers. Interestingly, the Presi-
dent of the National Association of Advertisers did not share Miller's
distaste for advertisement substantiation, asserting that business sup-
ported it and the additional expense was nothing business was "'con-
84. See id. at 9; see also WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLrrIcS
AND PROCESS 189-92 (1985).
85. See Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 12, at 9.
86. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
87. See Miller Advises FTC Staff To Be Less Adversarial With Businesses, 41 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1034, at A-13 (Oct. 8, 1981).
88. See id.
89. See id. at A-13, A-14. A few months later, Miller stated that one of the most
important things he had done in the beginning of his term was to hire persons sharing his
philosophy. See Revising Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 65, at 235.
90. Miller May Seek Elimination of Ad Substantiation Program, 41 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1037, at A-4 (Oct. 29, 1981).
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cerned about or aware of."' 91 Several weeks later Miller tried to clarify
his position. 2 He said he was troubled by certain aspects of the program,
but had not yet decided what action the FTC should take.9 3 He hau three
concerns. First, he felt it was not clear which claims needed to be sub-
stantiated,94 Second, he was troubled by how the Commission deter-
mined the meaning of claims.95 He believed that too often the FTC
found implied claims that the business never intended and by which most
consumers would not be mislead.96 Third, he criticized the flexible ap-
proach the FTC had used in regard to the amount of substantiation re-
quired.97 Miller suggested, for example, that the FTC might have been
requiring greater substantiation for objective claims than for subjective
claims.9 8 Finally, he recommended a reassessment of whether the Com-
mission should require substantiation prior to a company making
claims.9 9 The advertising substantiation program proved to be unsus-
ceptible to quick resolution. One year later, Miller repeated his reserva-
tions about requiring prior substantiation."' The director of the Bureau
of Economics suggested that no one knew what the effect of the program
was; it might actually be encouraging puffing and favoring some advertis-
ers over others.' 0 '
At the September 1981 press conference, Miller repeated his intention
not to be adversarial with business and argued that the FTC should "'not
... be exploring the edges of the law."' 10 2 Instead, he wanted a return to
traditional enforcement, 0 3 but predicted the Commission would bring
the same number of complaints it had previously."° Regarding an FTC
staff recommendation to require stronger disclosure of the health risks of
smoking, Miller characterized himself as a libertarian who believed that it
91. Id.
92. See FTC Chairman Tries to Clarify Position on Ad Substantiation, 41 Antitrust &






98. See id. at A-21.
99. See id.
100. See Muris Predicts at ABA Conference Some Lessening of Credit Disclosure in TV
Ads, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1090, at 932 (Nov. 18, 1982).
101. See id.
102. Miller May Seek Elimination of Ad Substantiation Program, supra note 90, at A-5.
103. See infra notes 408-17 and accompanying text (discussing whether the FTC did
return to "traditional" enforcement).
104. See infra notes 144-73 and accompanying text (discussing the applicable data).
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is a person's own affair whether to smoke. 10 5 This seems consistent with
his feeling that people are not as gullible as the FTC may have assumed
previously and can make their own decisions. Miller vowed that the
Commission would be strong despite threatened budget cuts, explaining
that many people at the agency were not productive and that independ-
ent agencies tend to be less energetic. 10 6 He even questioned the very
concept of independent agencies, believing they do not fit into the tripar-
tite structure envisioned by the Constitution.10 7 Consistent with Miller's
concern that too many FTC actions were the result of the exercise of
"unbridled discretion," the FTC under Miller's leadership urged Con-
gress to revise the FTC's statutory mandate by defining the terms "un-
fair" and "deceptive.'
10 8
II. THE CHAIRMAN As MANAGER OF THE AGENCY
A. Miller's Organization
Some agencies are largely run by the staff, which initiates most pro-
grams.' 0 9 Other agencies are run by all the commissioners jointly based
on a consensus model. 110 Still other agencies are run by a strong chair-
man who dominates the entire agency, sets the tone, and decides the
agenda. Such a chairman ensures his or her power and influence by fill-
ing positions with people loyal to the chairman's program, and loyal to
him or her personally."' The FTC under Miller followed the latter
model.
Miller appointed Timothy Muris to head the Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection. Muris was a staff member with Miller at the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB), a former FTC staff attorney, and a coauthor of
a book about the FTC entitled, The Federal Trade Commission Since
105. See Miller May Seek Elimination of Ad Substantiation Program, supra note 90, at
A-6.
106. See id. at A-5.
107. See id.
108. MILLER, supra note 7, at 3.
109. See WELBORN, supra note 5, at 25.
110. See id. at 7.
111. See id. at 22. Miller named to top positions Carol Crawford, who was a senior
advisor to the Reagan Administration's FTC's transition team, Larry Harlow and Karen
Stevens, who worked with Miller at OMB, and Fred McChesney, an attorney who was
about to receive a doctorate in economics. See Miller To Name OMB Aides To Top Posi-
tions At FTC, 41 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1032, at A-18 (Sept. 24, 1981).
A few months after his appointment, Miller acknowledged the significance of appointing
these people: "I think the most important thing was that I was able to bring aboard a good
group of people whose philosophies are consistent with my own." Miller Expects to Make
Recommendations for Revising Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 65, at 235.
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1970: Economic Regulation and Bureaucratic Behavior.112 In his book,
Muris suggests that the FTC's budget be frozen to reduce the size of the
agency by one-half when taking into account inflation.11 3 At the end of
five years, the budget could be increased if Muris's recommendations
were adopted. These recommendations included increased use of eco-
nomic analysis and other measures to constrain the agency. Muris called
the FTC "lawless" because it was not subject to meaningful judicial re-
view. 114 Muris concluded the book by declaiming, "So powerful and
harmful an agency must be constrained. Consumers simply cannot afford
otherwise."
' 1 5
Miller reorganized the structure of the agency. For example, two pro-
grams formerly handled by the regional offices were shifted to Washing-
ton, the role of senior management was strengthened, and the Office of
Congressional Relations was moved from the Office of the General
Counsel to the Office of the Chairman.'
16
There were reports that the staff was antagonized by Miller's resistance
to compromise on issues and his lack of familiarity with Commission
practices." 7 Miller admitted his unwillingness to compromise. He de-
scribed his general management style by saying he was "a very tough per-
son... inflexible, uncompromising, unyielding," who was determined not
"to be captured by the agency or by the agency's constituency.""
8
Miller's statement to the management team on the first day he took office
succinctly expressed his management philosophy: "'You are not to be the
staff and the Commission's constituent's representatives to me; you're to
be my representatives and the Commission's representatives to the staff
and the outside world.""' 9 Under his regime, the direction of initiatives
was to be "from the top down, rather than vice versa."' 2 °
112. See Miller To Name OMB Aides To Top Positions at FTC, supra note 111, at A-18.
113. See THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND
BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR 310 (Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris eds., 1981).
114. Id. at 312.
115. Id. at 315.
116. See Miller Reorganizes Commission, Consolidates Bureaus' Programs, 42 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1047, at 76-77 (Jan. 14, 1982).
117. See FTC Commissioners, Staff Are Antagonized by New Chairman's Management
Style, Not Ideas, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1049, at 213 (Jan. 28, 1982).
118. Miller Expects to Make Recommendations for Revising Federal Trade Commission
Act, supra note 65, at 235.
119. Id. at 236.
120. Id. This point was reiterated six months later in regard to FTC attorneys who in
the past had taken the initiative in commenting on the regulatory practices of other agen-
cies. See FTC Holds Policy Session, Instructs Staff To Consult Closely With Commissioners,
42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1069, at 1265-66 (June 17, 1982).
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Miller continued his strong management style into 1983. One example
illustrates just how strained the relationship between the Chairman and
Commissioners Pertschuk and Patricia P. Bailey had become. In an un-
precedented move, Miller assumed responsibility for handling interlocu-
tory motions, a job which previously had been performed by Pertschuk
only.12' In addition, he took away from Bailey the authority to approve
motions to quash subpoenas.' 22 Because they no longer had these
responsibilities, both were expected to lose one of their four staff attor-
neys. Pertschuk and Bailey reacted by claiming the loss of the staff attor-
neys was intended as punishment for opposing Miller. 123 Pertschuk's
problems stemmed from Miller's refusal to let Pertschuk examine weekly
staff reports prepared for Miller, in addition to barring Pertschuk from
meetings where cases were evaluated. 24 Miller later relented in part by
allowing Bailey, but not Pertschuk, to keep her fourth attorney.
25
The Chairman's effort to reduce the number of regional offices re-
flected his desire to be a strong manager who consolidated as much
power as possible in the headquarters office. His effort also illustrated
the external constraints on a chairman's management authority. Soon af-
ter assuming his post at the FTC, Miller and the other commissioners
were forced to consider closing regional offices. The OMB, the agency at
which Miller worked prior to his appointment to the FTC, had proposed
substantial budget cuts for the FTC.' 26 Miller recommended leaving
open only three offices out of the ten, but all three of the other commis-
121. See Miller Assumes New Duties; Moves Will Reduce Pertschuk, Bailey Staffs, 44
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1103, at 390 (Feb. 24, 1983).
122. See id.
123. See Pertschuk and Bailey Refuse to Cut Staffs After Miller Reorganization, 44 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1104, at 496 (Mar. 3, 1983). As will be seen, Bailey
already opposed the redefinition of the term deceptive and expressed differences over liti-
gated matters. See infra notes 179, 447-49 and accompanying text. In addition, Bailey
criticized the Commission's lack of enforcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; for
over a period of 18 months, the FTC had brought no ECOA cases. See FTC Commissioner
Blasts Staff For Lack of Enforcement of ECOA, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1065, at 1076 (May 20, 1982). Bailey attributed this lack of activity to staff insisting on
adding a level of economic analysis to the requirements of the statute. See id. One year
later Bailey, supported by Pertschuk, raised the same concerns, fearing that in effect the
FTC was administratively repealing the ECOA. See FTC Holds Policy Session to Discuss
ECOA Enforcement, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1074, at 233 (July 22,
1982). Pertschuk's spokesman claimed Pertschuk needed the disputed attorney position
because of the difficulties in learning what was happening at the Agency.
124. See Pertschuk and Bailey Refuse to Cut Staffs After Miller Reorganization, supra
note 123, at 496.
125. See Miller Agrees with Bailey to Allow Advisor to Remain on Personal Staff, 44
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1105, at 553 (Mar. 10, 1983).
126. See Diminished Budgetary Funding Forces FTC to Shut Down Four of Ten Re-
gional Offices, 41 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1036, at A-17 (Oct. 22, 1981).
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sioners voted to retain six offices.' 27 Seven months later, the FTC an-
nounced which offices would be closed.128 Miller justified the closings by
stating they were consistent with President Reagan's view of federalism;
less regional presence was necessary because of the growth of state and
local consumer offices, and fewer regional offices would be easier to
manage.129
B. Congressional Reaction to Miller's Consolidation Proposal
Representative Benjamin Rosenthal requested a postponement of
these actions to allow for hearings to be held on whether regional offices
should be closed. Although a critic of the regional offices in 1977, Rosen-
thal believed they had improved. 3 ° He held his hearing later that month.
Miller justified the closings, giving management objectives as a major rea-
son.' 3 ' He claimed closing offices would enable him to equalize wor-
kloads. He also questioned the productivity of the regional offices,
referring to data he claimed supported that charge.' 32 Bailey and Pert-
schuk testified in opposition to closing the offices. Pertschuk offered his
own statistics purporting to show that the offices were, in fact, productive.
One might wonder whether the proposal was merely part of Miller's
attempt to bully Bailey and Pertschuk, while showing the staff, the other
commissioners, and Congress that he was in charge. At the same time,
one might question whether the basis of Congress's opposition was the
desire to protect the Commission's ability to carry out Congress's con-
sumer protection mandate or to serve a more parochial political purpose.
Members of Congress battling Miller over the regional office closings ex-
pressed concerns about the effect upon their own districts.' 33 Conse-
127. See id.
128. See FTC Decides to Close its Four Offices in Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver, and
Boston, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1061, at 807 (Apr. 22, 1982).
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Rosenthal Blasts FTC Chairman on Closing of Four Regional Offices, 42 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1062, at 848 (Apr. 29, 1982).
132. See id. at 849. It is interesting to note that President Reagan's "FTC transition
team," which Miller headed, had recommended closing all of the regional offices. Id.
133. For example, Representative Rosenthal opposed Miller's plan in part because it
called for a decrease in the staff of the New York office while increasing the office's juris-
diction through the addition of the New England territory. See id. at 850. Congresswoman
Patricia Schroeder of Colorado objected to the closing of the Denver office. See id. At a
later Senate hearing, Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, Chairman of the State, Jus-
tice and Commerce Subcommittee, responded to Miller's justification for closing the of-
fices by advising Miller: "'don't ever close regional offices in the chairman's region."'
Weicker Lectures FTC Chairman on Closing of Boston Regional Office, 42 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1066, at 1114 (May 27, 1982). As a result of Weicker's influ-
ence, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to prohibit spending funds to close the
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quently, the FTC temporarily abandoned its effort to close the regional
offices.
The proposal to close the regional offices did not die, however. Seven
months later, facing a budget deficit despite the increased funding for
regional offices, Miller and two commissioners voted to close three re-
gional offices.' 34 Pertschuk and Bailey objected, with Pertschuk sug-
gesting the deficit be cured by reducing the amount of economic studies
and the frequency of intervening in the actions of other agencies. 135 A
House Appropriations subcommittee instructed the FTC not to close any
regional offices and to maintain viable operations in each. 136 Democrats
on the subcommittee pointed to earlier testimony by Commissioners
Miller and David Clanton, which indicated that almost all of the cases
involving consumer redress and the majority of the investigations came
out of the regional offices. As a result, the FTC was left with the task of
balancing its budget some other way. The issue ultimately was resolved
by an agreement that Miller reached with Republican Senators Paul Lax-
alt and Warren Rudman.' 37 Under the agreement, all ten offices would
remain open, but the staff of each was to be reduced to eighteen.' 38 To
fund the regional offices at that staff level, Miller and the Senators agreed
to seek an additional $2 million for the FTC.'39
Questions remained whether Miller was wise in his effort to close the
regional offices, and whether his prolonged effort was "inefficient" once
the strength of Congress's opposition became obvious. The controversy
lasted from October 1981 to February 1983, and involved meetings of the
commissioners, planning by staff, and hearings by congressional subcom-
mittees. The proposal substantially lowered morale among the staff at the
regional offices. The full Senate agreed, and increased the agency's budget by $3.6 million
to enable the FTC to continue operating the offices. See FTC Suspends Its Proposal to
Close Four Regional Offices, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1067, at 1155
(June 3, 1982).
134. See FTC Votes 3-2 to Close Three Regional Offices, 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1099, at 191 (Jan. 27, 1983).
135. See id.
136. See House Appropriations Panel Orders FTC to Maintain All 10 Regional Offices,
44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1101, at 265 (Feb. 10, 1983).
137. See Miller, Rudman, Laxalt Hold Meeting; Agreement Reached on Regional Of-
fices, 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1103, at 388 (Feb. 24, 1983).
138. See FTC Regional Offices Contemplate Streamlined Operations with Less Staff, 44
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1107, at 640 (Mar. 24, 1983).
139. See Miller, Rudman, Laxalt Hold Meeting; Agreement Reached on Regional Of-
fices, supra note 137, at 388.
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regional offices; Miller had questioned their performance and they
worked with the fear that they would be fired or, at best, transferred.14 °
The proposal split the Commission. One could criticize Miller for per-
sisting in a fight that was strongly opposed by two commissioners. Com-
missioners Pertschuk and Bailey were in the minority, opposing much of
what Miller was attempting to do. If Miller had taken their positions into
account, however, he would have backed down on most of his program.
As the battle continued to rage month after month, it provided constant
fodder for the two minority members and presumably made the divisive-
ness within the Commission even worse. Moreover, the proposal to close
offices was opposed at the outset by key members of Congress. 41 The
end result certainly was not a victory for Miller, for no offices were
closed, the strains within the Commission were exacerbated, and hostile
members of Congress focused their antagonism toward Miller.
The costs of asserting Miller's management prerogative far outweighed
any benefit. Miller regarded the office closing proposal as a management
issue, but he soon learned it was regarded by others as much more than
that. The proposal cost the Chairman political capital, staff morale, col-
legiality among commissioners, time, and effort. The only benefit was
reducing the size of the staffs at the regional office from a total of 237 to
180.142 The incident also illustrated the limits of even a strong chairman,
given Congress's oversight responsibilities and budgetary power.
The strong chairman model is consistent with the comprehensive ra-
tionality theory, under which policymaking is centralized and decided on
objective data-based empirical evidence and cost-benefit analysis.
143
Closing regional offices would have reduced fragmentation and increased
central control. Miller did, however, consolidate his control over the
Washington headquarters and increase his ability to ensure that policy
was based on comprehensive rationality by wrestling certain responsibili-
ties from dissident commissioners and hiring top level staff.
Miller was determined to adhere to the model of an agency which is
dominated by its chairman. His management style and policies were con-
140. See HARRIS & MILKIs, supra note 2, at 200, 210. The option of transferring to
Washington obviously did little to bolster the staff's spirits, because when the ultimate
resolution was implemented, few decided to move. See FTC Regional Offices Contemplate
Streamlined Operations With Less Staff, supra note 138, at 640.
141. See FTC Budget Will Face Congressional Scrutiny Because of Regional Offices, 44
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1100, at 219 (Feb. 3, 1983) (reporting that Sena-
tors Warren Rudman, Earnest Hollings and Congressman Neil Smith opposed the office
closings).
142. See Miller, Rudman, Laxalt Hold Meeting; Agreement Reached on Regional Of-
fices, supra note 137, at 388.
143. See Boyer, supra note 78, at 113-17; Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 12, at 7-9.
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sistent with that model. Given his mandate to change substantially the
direction of the agency, Miller's practices were consistent with the agency
model. Choosing an alternative model, or adopting a weaker version of
the chairman model, which gave more of a voice to other commissioners
or the staff, would have made it more difficult for Miller to achieve his
goals.
Following the strong chairman model, however, has substantial costs.
Given the bipartisan, staggered term structure of Commission appoint-
ments, a domineering chairman is likely to clash with other commission-
ers. Even if opposing commissioners are in the minority, as they were
during Miller's chairmanship, they can be a constant thorn in the chair-
man's side, decreasing the productivity and efficiency of conducting the
Commission's business. In addition, opposing commissioners presumably
are eager to supply sympathetic members of Congress with grist for their
mills. Moreover, an agency ordinarily has an abundance of career em-
ployees. A strong management style, emphasizing a "top-down" ap-
proach which questions the loyalty and worth of experienced
professionals, ineluctably raises staff anxiety and resentment, thereby
thwarting productivity and creativity. Miller further decreased staff mo-
rale by proposing the closing of all regional offices, as the head of Rea-
gan's FTC transition team, and then by pushing for the closing of most of
the offices as Chairman. Finally, the model's limitations became most
apparent when Miller tried to apply the model in the face of congres-
sional opposition.
C. The Numbers Game: Arguing Quality over Quantity
Commissioner Bailey and others decried the decline in the number and
quality of cases brought under Miller's chairmanship."' Table I demon-
strates that there was a definite decrease in the number of enforcement
cases brought while Miller was chairman. 145 At the same time, however,
the agency obviously did not stop enforcing the law altogether.
The difficulty of drawing conclusions from the caseload data is illus-
trated by a House committee oversight hearing held a little over one year
after Miller took office. Miller claimed the FTC was very productive de-
144. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
145. Note that the numbers in Table I are compiled from the Annual Reports of the
FTC. Those reports are based on the fiscal year. Thus, the data for the year labeled 1982
refers to the twelve months which ended on September 30, 1982. Miller became chairman
at the beginning of the 1982 fiscal year and resigned at the end of fiscal year 1985. The
numbers also must be viewed in light of substantial budget cuts, supported by Miller, which
occurred during the years Miller was chairman. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at
204-05.
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spite having a substantially smaller staff.1 46 Then Democratic Congress-
men Albert Gore and John Dingell countered with data showing a
downturn in 1977 and 1982, coinciding with changes in the White
House. 147  Their numbers indicated less enforcement activity under
Miller. 148 Miller cautioned the validity of judging performance solely by
counting cases and claimed the FTC was handling quality cases.149 Pert-
schuk disagreed, claiming many of the cases should have been handled
criminally or involved companies almost in bankruptcy. Muris had insti-
tuted a new procedure requiring regional offices to confer with an econo-
mist at the FTC headquarters before entering settlement negotiations."'
Congressmen Gore and Dingell charged the FTC was engaging in exces-
sive economic analysis that led to undue delays in enforcement. 51
At times Miller claimed the FTC under his leadership was bringing a
substantial number of cases, 152 but at other times, he showed disdain for
the entire enterprise of demonstrating that the agency was bringing an
adequate number of cases. 153 For example, in testifying before a House
Appropriations subcommittee early in 1983, Miller stated: "'Far more im-
portant' than bringing cases ... are efforts to educate businessmen and
consumers."
154
One year after taking office, Miller issued a report on the Commis-
sion's accomplishments. 155 One of Miller's most important goals was to
improve the relationship between the FTC and Congress. 156 He claimed
the previous adversarial relationship had given the agency a bad reputa-
tion.157 The report showed that Miller had improved management, in-
146. See House Commerce Committee Holds Hearing on FTC Enforcement Activity







153. This disdain for bringing substantial numbers of cases was consistent with Miller's
background as an economist rather than a lawyer, and reflected his goal of protecting con-
sumers by improving the functioning of markets. Economists tend to favor attacking
problems through "comprehensive planning and policy analysis." Hawkins & Thomas,
supra note 12, at 21. It is not surprising, therefore, that Miller would be skeptical of the
case-by-case approach which he might have regarded as incrementalism, the approach that
often adopts strategies that are "remedial and ad hoc." Id. at 8.
154. House Appropriations Panel Orders FTC To Maintain All 10 Regional Offices,
supra note 136, at 265.
155. See FTC Chairman Places Blame for Political Problems on Legacy of Past, 43Anti-
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cluding coordination and supervision, and that the FTC was
concentrating on enforcement rather than new rulemaking proceed-
ings. 158 In regard to enforcement actions, Miller reported that the staff
had been told to focus on fraud "'and other traditional law violations'
rather than experimenting with "'novel theories."'159 He then repeated
his plea for a definition of "deceptive. ' 6 ° In Commissioner David
Clanton's view, the most important accomplishment was the development
of an economics approach in addressing consumer cases. 161 In contrast,
Pertschuk claimed Miller had spent most of his time the first year in try-
ing to close several regional offices (an effort Congress eventually
blocked), pushing Congress to enact new legislation to weaken the Com-
mission (which Congress refused to do), and providing a forum for econ-
omists which served to halt enforcement activity.'
62
The disagreement regarding the Commission's progress continued after
Miller completed his second year. He claimed the FTC was concentrating
on "'quality' cases" rather than wasting time on "'legal frolics."' 163 Pert-
schuk countered that enforcement activity was forty percent less under
Miller."6 Bailey complained that the Commission was not tackling major
fraud problems. 65 Miller justified the FTC's enforcement workload after
his third year in office by declaring that the FTC, unlike the Commission
under Pertschuk, would "'not be a great morality court.""' 166 Miller ex-
plained that he had altered the agency's priorities so it would engage in
"'sober calculation"' rather than "'moralistic posturing."",167 Although
the number of cases brought by the Commission might be lower, he had
achieved voluntary compliance from businesses by establishing a "'coop-
erative"' relationship with industry. 168  Although he had terminated
cases, this was necessary when cases were based primarily on "'social the-
158. See id.
159. Id. He included a table indicating there had been much enforcement activity. See
id. The table highlighted that 204 initial phase investigations had started and 66 had
closed. Furthermore, 28 full phase investigations were opened, and six were closed. See id.
160. See FTC Chairman Places Blame for Political Problems on Legacy of Past, supra
note 155, at 768.
161. See id.
162. See id. The National Consumers League also criticized Miller's first year in office.
See Consumer Group Calls Miller Report on FTC Activity "Piece of Puffery," 43 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1089, at 894 (Nov. 11, 1982).
163. Miller Defends Record Before House Subcommittee, 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1140, at 781 (Nov. 17, 1983).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Administration's Goal of Keeping Markets Competitive Has Worked, Miller De-




FTC's Consumer Protection Program
ories." ' 6 9 Miller thus justified the low numbers in his first three years by
charging that the numbers under Pertschuk were inflated by frivolous
cases based on a Commission pushing its own social agenda, rather than
the neutral, objective economic analysis employed under Miller.
170
Pertschuk scoffed at Miller's characterization of the FTC's new approach
as a neutral economic analysis. He claimed that Reagan's appointees
used "economics as a 'veneer' to disguise hidden biases and value judg-
ments. 1 71 He accused these regulators of ignoring "'human misery and
suffering, greed and avarice,"' by putting unwarranted faith in economic
efficiency and the ability of markets to correct themselves.
172
The issue then becomes whether it is appropriate for a new chairman,
absent any alteration in the agency's jurisdiction or authority, to change
drastically the adjudication program of the agency. On the one hand, one
could argue that such action is appropriate. The statute provides for the
President to appoint the chairman; therefore, he or she can appoint a
chairman who may make any changes not precluded by a statute or the
Constitution. In addition, the chairman cannot prevail without persuad-
ing at least two other commissioners of the wisdom of such changes. On
the other hand, if every chairman felt free to implement a radical restruc-
turing of adjudicatory priorities as long as he or she could command a
majority of commission votes, industry and consumers could have no con-
fidence that reliance on current FTC adjudication policies would provide
a reliable guide for what would be considered a statutory violation in the
future. In addition, the chairman's ability to gain the support of two
other commissioners may be due, not so much to their agreement with
the chairman's agenda, but to the chairman's influence derived from his
or her control over budget, personnel, and assignments.
1 73
169. Id.
170. Id. It is instructive to remember that Miller admitted at his confirmation hearings
that the cost-benefit analysis often was "a fairly subjective test." Miller Hearings, supra
note 44, at 5.
171. Pertschuk Reviews Regulators' Principles of New Economics, 45 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1136, at 619 (Oct. 20, 1983).
172. Id. The reduced adjudicatory activity is further supported by Miller's imposition
of an approach which favored bringing fewer cases. Miller criticized the higher numbers
under Pertschuk as reflecting cases that should not have been brought. If there was no
basis for bringing them, however, presumably those cases would have been appealed and
ultimately dismissed. The fact that this did not occur indicates that there was a sound legal
basis for them. Only two consumer cases decided while Pertschuck was chairman were
appealed, and in neither case did the court hold that the Commission lacked a legal basis
for bringing an action against the respondent. See Lee v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 679 F.2d
905, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming an FTC order); Grolier Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
615 F.2d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 1980) (vacating an FTC order and remanding the case be-
cause the Administrative Law Judge should have recused himself).
173. See WELBORN, supra note 5, at 22.
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III. THE CAMPAIGN TO REVISE THE DEFINITION OF DECEPTION
A. Miller Meets Opposition in his Efforts to "Redefine" Deception
One of Miller's top priorities was to effect a change in the definition of
"deception." This was a critical battle because most consumer enforce-
ment cases are brought under the deceptive practices arm of the FTC's
authority under section 5 of the FTC Act, and most Trade Regulation
Rules (TRRs) are based on a record showing that deceptive practices
justify regulation. The manner in which Miller waged this battle raises
important policy issues and suggests the need for legislative change.
Miller initially attempted to persuade Congress to define the FTC
Act's term "deceptive.' 1 74 Miller, testifying on behalf of himself and not
representing the views of any of the other commissioners, recommended
that the definition of deception should require evidence that consumers
were injured.' 75 He suggested this could be accomplished by including
materiality as an element of deception.176 In addition, the FTC should be
limited to bringing cases involving representations of fact, not opinion.
Finally, the standard for deception should be "'whether reasonable con-
sumers are likely to be deceived, not whether any consumers might be
deceived. ' " 77 In regard to vulnerable groups of consumers, however, the
test should be whether the company "'knew or should have known that
the act or practice was deceptive, regardless of whether or not reasonable
consumers were deceived.""
'178
174. This was done in conjunction with a request for a congressional definition of the
term "unfairness." See Miller Circulates Proposal To Limit FTC Attacks on Deception, 42
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1056, at 589-90 (Mar. 18, 1982). As Muris noted,
a statutory definition of "unfairness," but not "deception," was not by itself sufficient be-
cause deception is such a broad concept. See id. at 590.
175. See id.
176. See Miller Suggests Revisions in Deception Standard of § 5, 42 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1057, at 629 (Mar. 25, 1982). Industry also supported a restrictive
definition of deception. See Advertising Groups Stake Out New Position on Amending
FTC Act Standard on Deception, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1060, at 771
(Apr. 15, 1982) (stating that three advertising associations "proposed that deceptive acts or
practices be unlawful where they 'consist of material representations known to be false or
made in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity"'); Kasten is Preparing Bill on FTC
Reauthorization; Miller Finds Little Success for Deception Proposal, 42 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1062, at 867 (Apr. 29, 1982) (indicating that the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers proposed "extending to deception the FTC's proposed definition of
unfairness"); Miller Suggests Revisions in Deception Standard of § 5, supra (indicating that
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce "made a recommendation similar to that made by the
Commission majority").
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Pertschuk opposed Miller's proposal, arguing that it ran counter to cur-
rent law. Clanton, Bailey, and Pertschuk later testified against Miller's
proposal. 179 Clanton feared that establishing new standards would create
uncertainty.' 80 He contended that if there were instances in which the
Commission's actions were misguided, the fault lay with the application
of the standards, not with the standards themselves.' 8 ' Bailey echoed
Clanton's position and opposed making it more difficult for the Commis-
sion to prevent deception while a small budget was already making it
difficult to enforce the present standards.'82 Pertschuk challenged the list
of cases Miller had been using to support his position, contending that
they represented a very small number of mainly old cases.' 8 3
The Republican chairman of the Senate subcommittee who was
charged with preparing changes to the FTC Act decided not to support
Miller's "deception" proposal.1" Despite this lack of backing, Miller dis-
played his tenacity, some might say stubbornness, by continuing to push
for his revision. He may, however, have lost some of the respect of the
Senate in the process.185 Ultimately, the Republican-controlled Senate
decided not to include Miller's proposal in its reauthorization bill.
In 1982, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce requested
that the FTC submit to it "'an analysis of its deception jurisdiction as
presently applied by the Commission and interpreted in case law."" 86
The FTC prepared drafts of a proposed response, and the Wisconsin At-
torney General asked the FTC to obtain public comment.18 7 This request
did not call for anything unusual. The FTC's consideration of its advertis-
ing substantiation policy during Miller's chairmanship was far less signifi-
cant, but a lengthy public comment period was provided and Miller urged
those interested to submit their reactions.188 Pertschuk made a motion to
179. See Miller May Support Exemption for Professions if Congress Won't Redefine Un-
fairness, Deception, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1059, at 737-38 (Apr. 8,
1982).
180. See id. at 737.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 738.
184. See Kasten Is Preparing Bill on FTC Reauthorization; Miller Finds Little Success
for Deception Proposal, supra note 176, at 865.
185. See id. at 866. "Several Senate staff members wondered why the FTC Chairman
still is sticking with his proposal. 'He's going to lose, and it's going to embarrass him,'
commented one staffer." Id.
186. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey Concerning the Commis-
sion's Statement on Deception, 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1137, at 695
(Oct. 27, 1983) [hereinafter Deception Policy Statement, Bailey's Dissent].
187. See Miller Calls For Vote on Policy Governing Deceptive Practices, 45 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1136, at 610 (Oct. 20, 1983).
188. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
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require an opportunity for public comment on the proposed deception
statement, but a tie vote prevented passage. 89 On October 14, 1983, the
FTC submitted a statement in response to the Committee's request. 190
The statement was approved by three Commissioners: the Chairman and
Commissioners Douglas' 91 and Clanton.192 Commissioner Clanton's ap-
proval was obtained on the last day of his term. Dissenting were Com-
missioners Bailey and Pertschuk.1
93
The majority's statement purported to provide "a single definitive
statement of the Commission's view of its authority."' 94 The statement
identified the three elements of a deceptive act or practice case.' 95 The
first element required that "there must be a representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer.' 96 The statement
stressed that the first element did not require a finding of actual con-
sumer deception. 97 Depending on the facts and circumstances of each
case, the Commission may or may not require presentation of extrinsic
evidence. 98
The second element of a deceptive act or practice case involves the
consumer's interpretation or reaction to the seller's representations or
practices. 199 The Commission would consider the challenged act or prac-
tice from the perspective of "reasonable consumers., 2 00 The statement
explains this element by saying that "[t]he test is whether the consumer's
interpretation or reaction is reasonable. When representations or sales
practices are targeted to a specific audience, the Commission determines
189. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pertschuk Concerning the Commission's
Statement on Deception, 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1137, at 697 (Oct. 27,
1983) [hereinafter Deception Policy Statement, Pertschuk's Dissent].
190. See Deception Policy Statement, Bailey's Dissent, supra note 186, at 695.
191. Commissioner George Douglas filed a concurring statement in which he disputed
the assertion that the majority statement was rushed through without due deliberation. See
Concurring Statement of Commissioner George W. Douglas Concerning the Commission's
Statement on Deception, 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1137, at 699 (Oct. 27,
1983). He also defended the substantive portion in the majority statement. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. FTC's Policy Statement on Deception Sent to Chairmen of Senate Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation Committee and House Energy and Commerce Committee, 45 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1137, at 689 (Oct. 27, 1983) [hereinafter Deception
Policy Statement]
195. See id. at 689-94.
196. Id. at 689.
197. See id. at 690.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 691.
200. Id.
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the effect of the representation or practice on a reasonable member of
that group."
20 1
The third element of a deceptive act or practice case is that the repre-
sentation, omission, or practice must be material.20 2 One of the most
controversial aspects of the majority's statement was its definition of the
term "material." The majority equated materiality with injury, stating
that material information is that which is likely to affect consumers'
choices and cause injury if inaccurate or omitted.20 3
Commissioner Bailey's dissent charged that the majority statement "is
an ill-conceived and frankly radical attempt to change the law of decep-
tion and create new and restrictive legal standards which would constrain
the Commission's traditional and important law enforcement activi-
ties., 204 Commissioner Bailey attacked the substance of the statement
because it rewrote the law as she understood it, misstated the present law,
and could be used to take away consumer protection.20 5 She charged that
the first element created confusion because it substituted the standard of
likelihood in place of the former "tendency or capacity to mislead con-
sumers standard., 206 Bailey posed several questions to show how much
confusion this new standard of likelihood created.20 7 She also attacked
the second element, noting that it represented a substantial departure
from the holdings of the Commission and courts which found that acts or
practices could be deceptive even if they did not mislead sophisticated
consumers.20 8 Bailey criticized the third element because it equated ma-
teriality with injury. She believed this suggested "that actual injury must
be shown before a finding of materiality is made." 2 9 She claimed that
equating the two concepts was contrary to the law and would restrict the
FTC.
2 1 0
Finally, Bailey criticized the process that was used in issuing this state-
ment, claiming that the Commissioners were in the process of negotiating
the text of the statement when the negotiations were broken off and the
201. Id. (footnote omitted). Where representations or sales practices are targeted at a
specific audience, such as children, the Commission considers the effect of the challenged
representation or practice on a reasonable member of that audience. See id.
202. See id. at 693.
203. See id. at 693-94.





209. Id. at 696.
210. See id. (indicating that such a standard could "severely and unacceptably narrow
the Commission's advertising substantiation doctrine").
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Chairman brought the statement for a vote on the last day of Commis-
sioner Clanton's term.211 The clear implication was that the Chairman
rushed the statement through just so that he could obtain a three-vote
majority before Clanton departed.
Commissioner Pertschuk also filed a dissenting statement.212 Like Bai-
ley, Pertschuk criticized the process the Chairman used in gaining a ma-
jority vote.213 He claimed that both he and Bailey wanted to reach a
consensus with the rest of the commissioners, but were unable to do so
because of the Chairman's desire to bring the matter to a vote before
Clanton left the Commission.21 4 Pertschuk also was disturbed by the fact
that the timing made it impossible for the public to respond to the state-
ment that was being considered.215 In particular, the state attorneys gen-
eral had requested the opportunity to submit their reactions to the
statement before it was released in final form.2 16 They were unable to do
so because of the Chairman's insistence that it be voted on before
Clanton left the Commission.217
Pertschuk then criticized the three elements of a deception case out-
lined in the majority's statement.21 8 Pertschuk noted that the majority
statement was very similar to Chairman Miller's proposed changes to the
FTC Act.2"9 Pertschuk asserted that the statement was, in fact, a reinter-
pretation of current law in a way that was consistent with the statutory
changes Miller had originally proposed to Congress, which Congress
rejected.22°
The reaction of John Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, was swift and negative. He rejected the FTC's
policy statement.22' He said that his Committee had asked for a neutral
analysis of the FTC's deception jurisdiction and proposals for statutory
changes, and that the FTC statement was not responsive to that re-
quest.222 Congressman Dingell challenged the procedure which was used
to obtain a three to two majority vote on the enforcement policy state-
211. See id. at 695.
212. See Deception Policy Statement, Pertschuk's Dissent, supra note 189, at 696.





218. See id. at 697-98.
219. See id. at 697.
220. See id.
221. See Dingell, Miller Tangle Over New Enforcement Policy on Deception, 45 Anti-
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ment, namely Clanton's vote just prior to his term ending.223 Dingell
claimed that the Office of the Commission Secretary had told Miller's
office and the FTC General Counsel that pursuant to FTC tradition, the
vote of a commissioner whose term is expiring does not count unless the
other commissioners vote prior to the expiration of the commissioner's
term.22 4 In this case, because Bailey and Pertschuk voted after Clanton's
term expired, Clanton's vote should not have counted.225 Dingell also
explained that he rejected the enforcement statement for two reasons: the
statement served to weaken the FTC's deception standard; and the state-
ment was not, as Dingell had requested, a neutral statement of the cur-
rent law.226
Miller's response to Dingell's rejection of the deception enforcement
statement demonstrates how far relations between Dingell's committee
and Miller had deteriorated. Miller was quoted as saying, "'We usually
try [to] respond to requests from Congress, but we don't work for the
Committee Chairman or a committee.'
' 227
In addition to his response to Dingell, Miller defended the enforcement
statement by claiming that it was nothing more than a "'consistent syn-
thesis"' of the FTC's treatment of deception in the past few years. 228 This
is in contrast to Miller's statements when he asked Congress to revise the
FTC Act in regard to FTC jurisdiction over deception. At that time he
acknowledged that his proposal changed the law, but that it was neces-
sary "'to correct three problems. '229 The subsequent policy statement
covers the same ground, but according to Miller, was not an attempt to
change the law.
Miller did acknowledge that the statement did not include "principles
from some 'outlying' decisions" and he admitted that this statement
"'might have screened out a few cases.""'23 On the one hand, Miller
223. See Dingell Challenges Legitimacy of Clanton's Vote on Deception Statement, 45




227. Dingell; Miller Tangle, supra note 221, at 664. This "in your face" personal re-
sponse to Congressman Dingell raises serious questions about the proper relationship be-
tween Congress and a regulatory agency that is purporting to act pursuant to a
congressional statute.
228. Id. at 665.
229. Miller Suggests Revisions in Deception Standard of§ 5, supra note 176, at 629. The
three problems were the lack of a materiality requirement, the need to prohibit the FTC
from attacking statements of opinion, and the need for a "reasonable consumer" standard.
Id.
230. Dingell Miller Tangle, supra note 221, at 665.
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stated, "'I don't really see it as a change."' 23 At the same time, Miller
attacked the previous deception standard as too vague, and favored using
new standards such as a "reasonable man" analysis and whether the de-
ception was "material., 232 Although claiming that the statement did not
change the law of deception, Miller attacked the standard of "tendency or
capacity" to deceive, which had been used in many previous cases, 233 be-
cause that standard was "'hardly more than a tautology on its face.'
' 234
Miller also claimed that under the new enforcement policy the FTC
would not have to show actual injury to prove materiality.235 Miller said
that those who read the enforcement statement as equating actual injury
and materiality "'have it exactly backward.'
' 236
During oversight hearings, James Florio, the Democratic Chairman of
the House Commerce, Transportation and Tourism Subcommittee, de-
nounced the October policy statement on deception, stating there was
"the 'troubling possibility that there has been a breakdown of law en-
forcement at the FTC.' ' ' 2 37 Florio claimed the policy was contrary to the
public's wishes.238 Pertschuk claimed the FTC was "'consciously neglect-
ing' the big national advertising campaigns and [doing] 'nothing yet to
slow the tide or even study the implications of liquor, beer, and wine
advertising' frequently directed at young people., 239 Bailey expressed
concern over the smaller number of cases the Commission brought and
the quality of those cases.24 Commissioners Douglas and Terry Calvani
supported the policy, asserting that the policy statement distilled princi-
ples from the cases, rather than trying to change the law. Douglas
claimed the policy merely requires a showing of likely injury; it does not
require proving actual injury.24 1 Furthermore, Douglas found the Com-
mission's position was that an advertisement is considered deceptive if it
does not have a "reasonable basis.",242 The Attorney General of Tennes-
see disagreed that the policy statement was merely a restatement of past
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.; Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 143 F.2d 676 (2d
Cir. 1944) (finding representations having a capacity to deceive unlawful as false
advertising).
234. Dingell, Miller Tangle, supra note 221, at 665.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. House Subcommittee Examines Possible Breakdown of Enforcement Efforts at
FTC, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1153, at 287 (Feb. 23, 1984).
238. See id.
239. Id. at 288.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 289.
242. See id.
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principles. He claimed it was "not 'an accurate statement of the law of
deception.' ' 243 Pertschuk and Bailey later submitted a formal statement
expressing their views.24 Whereas the statement of Miller and two other
commissioners was denounced by Congressman Dingell as "'not respon-
sive, ' ' 241 Dingell praised the statement Bailey and Pertschuk submitted.
In a June 1984 letter, Congressmen Dingell and Florio denounced the
Commission for attempting "'to dismantle the law against false advertis-
ig."' They stated that "[d]espite '[h]aving been rebuffed by Congress
when you sought a legislative change in the law, you have attempted to
weaken the law against such deception by administrative fiat.'
' 246
Dingell and Florio claimed that some rules seemed to have disappeared,
while other rules and cases had been abandoned.247 Miller responded by
claiming the Commission was concentrating on conduct which actually
harms consumers, rather than being the national nanny. He said the
Dingell and Florio letter "was the result of 'bloated congressional com-
mittee staffs' who 'sit around drafting silly partisan letters.' ' 248 It ap-
peared Miller had abandoned his original objective of improving the
relationship between the FTC and Congress, at least as far as critical
Democratic members were concerned.
B. The Enforcement of Deception at the State Level
The actions of the FTC and the definition and enforcement of decep-
tion directly affects the states.249 Many states have mini-FTC statutes
that incorporate the standards adopted pursuant to the FTC Act. In ad-
dition, to the extent that the FTC reduces its enforcement, the slack must
243. Id.
244. See Deception Policy Statement Prepared by Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk
and Transmitted on Feb. 29 to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 46 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1154, at 372 (Mar. 1, 1984); Pertschuk-Bailey Policy Statement
on Deception is Forwarded to Dingell, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1154, at
325 (Mar. 1, 1984) [hereinafter Pertschuk-Bailey Policy Statement].
245. Dingell, Miller Tangle, supra note 221, at 664; Pertschuk-Bailey Policy Statement,
supra note 244, at 325.
246. Dingell, Florio Strongly Urge Miller to Return to Traditional Enforcement, 46 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1168, at 1081 (June 7, 1984).
247. See id.
248. FTC Has Restored Sense of Balance in Its Priorities, Miller Retorts, 46 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169, at 1132 (June 14, 1984).
249. The federalism problems resulted from the state attorneys general attempting to
enforce consumer protection law in the vacuum produced by the Miller FTC's inactivity.
See Roger E. Schechter, A Retrospective on the Reagan FTC: Musings on the Role of an
Administrative Agency, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 489, 505-06 (1990). As Professor Schechter
points out, to the extent the individual states did step in to fill the vacuum, they created
problems for businesses who faced inconsistent enforcement policies. See id. at 506.
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be taken up by the states if consumer protection is to be preserved.25 ° It
is no surprise, therefore, that the state attorneys general, who are those
responsible in most states for enforcing the mini-FTC acts, would have
definite views in regard to the FTC's enforcement policy statement on
deception.
At a meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG), the attorneys general adopted a resolution which expressed
their view that the definition of deception, which Miller had proposed as
a legislative change to Congress, would "substantially impair the ability of
attorneys general to protect consumers in each state." '251 The resolution
noted that the proposed legislative change would reduce the ability of the
attorneys general to protect consumers because it had the potential of
weakening the legal interpretation of those mini-FTC acts which are
based on the FTC Act.252 In addition, the legislative change would place
a greater burden on the state attorneys general if they were to protect
consumers in regard to interstate deception.253 The resolution specifi-
cally addressed the FTC policy statement on deception, claiming that the
description in the statement of deception was "substantially different
from the existing case law, [and] would depart from the principles devel-
oped over decades of Federal Trade Commission enforcement, and seeks
to adopt administratively the restrictive definition not enacted by the
Congress. '254 The resolution specifically opposed the definition of de-
ception as it appeared in the enforcement statement.255
Carol Crawford, the Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection, responded to the criticisms of the attorneys general.256 She
claimed that the policy statement was not a departure from previous en-
forcement and did not change the definition of deception.257 According
to her, the statement simply explained how the Commission and the
courts have interpreted deception.25 s
250. See generally JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRAC-
TICES (3d ed. 1991).
251. NAAG Disputes FTC's Policy on Deception, Wants Bills on Overcharges, Rule 6(e),
RPM, 45 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1145, at 1052 (Dec. 22, 1983) [herein-
after NAAG Disputes FTC's Policy]. More recently, NAAG and the FTC have battled
over the state's role in regulating national advertising. See generally Jef I. Richards, FTC
or NAAG: Who Will Win the Territorial Battle?, 10 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 118
(1991).
252. See NAAG Disputes FTC's Policy, supra note 251, at 1052.
253. See id. at 1052-53.
254. Id. at 1053.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 1052-53.
257. See id. at 1053.
258. See id.
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She also acknowledged that there were similarities between the views
of Chairman Miller and the policy statement that purported to be merely
the FTC's interpretation of deception under the FTC Act in recent
years.259 She attributed that similarity to the fact that Miller's views on
deception and the policy statement reflected the FTC's actual deception
enforcement practices in past years.260
C. Did Miller Truly Redefine the Deception Standard or Merely
Restate the Current Law?
One has to wonder why Miller and his staff continued to allege publicly
that the statement merely restated the current law when so many of those
most familiar with FTC law, its interpretation and application, read the
enforcement statement entirely differently.26 1 Did Miller really believe
that his reading was correct and that everyone else was reading it incor-
rectly or refusing to acknowledge that it was merely a restatement of the
law? Miller's own comments contain contradictions. 262 He admitted that
his proposal to Congress was a change in the law, and acknowledged that
he had ignored principles the Commission and the courts adopted in
drafting the enforcement statement. One wonders why Miller did not
simply acknowledge that the majority of the Commission intended to de-
fine deception more narrowly than before. Perhaps Miller sought to
avoid a direct confrontation with Congress.263
The deception enforcement policy statement also obviously demon-
strated the deteriorating relationships among the FTC commissioners.
Both Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk complained about rushing to
vote on the policy statement instead of continuing to negotiate.2 6 Inter-
estingly, after the statement was submitted to Congress, Miller defended
the process that was used. He pointed out that the Commission had con-
sidered the policy statement for one and one-half years,265 and that he
waited until Commissioner Clanton's last day in office to call a vote to
259. See id. at 1052.
260. See id. The resolution adopted by NAAG, however, demonstrates how completely
NAAG rejected her characterization of the deception standard.
261. See, e.g., Jack E. Karns, The Federal Trade Commission's Evolving Deception Pol-
icy, 22 U. Rici. L. REv. 399, 429-30 (1988) (concluding the FTC's policy statement re-
flected an important change in the law of deception).
262. See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
263. When Congressman Dingell rejected the enforcement statement, however, Miller
did not hesitate to confront Congress on the issue. See supra note 227 and accompanying
text.
264. See Deception Policy Statement, Bailey's Dissent, supra note 186, at 695; Deception
Policy Statement, Pertschuk's Dissent, supra note 189, at 697.
265. See Dingell, Miller Tangle, supra note 221, at 665.
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provide the commissioners sufficient time to discuss and negotiate the
terms of the statement. Thus, while insisting on a statement that would
undoubtedly infuriate two of the commissioners, Miller took pains to ex-
plain that he was committed to a collegial commission which would fully
debate important issues.
It is difficult to determine what Miller was trying to achieve by issuing
the new deception enforcement statement. What he first characterized as
significant changes, he later recharacterized as nothing more than a
clearer and more consistent restatement of present FTC enforcement pol-
icy. The traditional standards that were accepted, explained, and refined
in the case law were dismissed as "outlying" decisions. Language which
others understood as equating actual injury with materiality was inter-
preted as meaning just the opposite by Miller. The enforcement state-
ment rejected long-followed standards such as "tendency or capacity" to
deceive and instead inserted new language establishing new standards.
Miller claimed that these new standards, never before applied or inter-
preted in FTC cases, would somehow reduce confusion.
It is true that the old tests lacked certainty as to which practices might
be considered deceptive. This was justified, however, because merchants
were constantly looking for new ways to advertise and otherwise market
their goods and services. Consequently, the FTC needed broad and flexi-
ble standards to cover new forms of deception. The old tests contained a
certain amount of ambiguity to protect consumers appropriately under
the statute.
Miller's focus was far different. He sought a standard that was as defi-
nite, concrete, and consistent as possible so merchants would know when
their practices might run afoul of the FTC Act. The enforcement state-
ment, however, did not achieve that goal. Its new standards and new
terms raised multiple questions of interpretation and application.
Miller's approach, moreover, raised questions about whether he hoped
to achieve something more than consistency and certainty for the busi-
ness community. Congress, showing no desire to limit the FTC's decep-
tion jurisdiction, rejected Miller's proposal to amend the FTC Act by
narrowly defining deception. Nevertheless, when asked by a House com-
mittee for a statement of existing FTC deceptive enforcement policy,
Miller issued a statement which seemed to decrease significantly the
FTC's jurisdiction. Miller's attempted justification of this statement as
being responsive to the committee's request lacks credibility, however,
2 66
for it appears that he may have had other reasons for issuing the enforce-
266. Miller's justification lacks credibility because what he had previously told Congress
were necessary changes in the law were recharacterized in the enforcement statement as
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ment policy statement. Perhaps a direct confrontation with Congress is
what Miller sought to achieve. Agencies generally prefer to avoid con-
flict with Congress because they fear Congress will respond by decreasing
their appropriations or reducing their jurisdiction. That may be exactly
what Miller was trying to accomplish. Ironically, because Miller desired
to reduce government enforcement and regulation, Congress could only
counter Miller's efforts by passing legislation specifically increasing the
FTC's jurisdiction and funding. Congress would be reluctant to respond
in this way, however, because it would be giving increased power and
money to an agency headed by a chairman whose goals were contrary to
what Congress sought to achieve. Thus, Miller may have hoped to obtain
his ultimate objective by using the deception enforcement policy state-
ment as a catalyst for conflict and confrontation with Congress, goading
Congress into reducing the FTC's budget and authority.
What then did Miller's initiative in issuing the enforcement statement
accomplish? It further alienated two FTC commissioners. It greatly an-
gered the state attorneys general and the chairman of a vital congres-
sional committee with direct jurisdiction over the FTC. Yet it may have
accomplished Miller's objectives. Congress did not pass legislation defin-
ing deception in a way that would repeal the description in the enforce-
ment statement. Moreover, some courts have followed the definitions
and descriptions in the enforcement statement.267 The Commission,
therefore, was able to apply the statement in deciding which cases to in-
vestigate and pursue. Although Miller was hostile to the "independent
agency" concept,26 s the inability of the opponents of the statement to
prevent the FTC from implementing it demonstrates the extent to which
the FTC was able to act as a truly independent agency.
Miller's behavior is consistent with the theory of comprehensive ration-
ality. Under this theory, an agency acts independent of outside influ-
ences, basing policy on empirical evidence and cost-benefit analysis.
2 69
The failure to provide notice and a period of public comment is consistent
with the theory, because such public participation may result in pressure
to compromise the integrity of the agency's objective, rational, and neu-
tral analysis.27°
Nevertheless, the FTC Act should be amended to require notice and a
public comment period prior to adopting substantive policy changes relat-
mere reflections of current FTC enforcement policy. What had been long established prin-
ciples, were now characterized as "outlying" cases. See id.
267. See infra notes 455-58 and accompanying text.
268. See infra notes 524-29 and accompanying text.
269. See Boyer, supra note 78, at 116; Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 12, at 8.
270. See Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 12, at 9.
19971
Catholic University Law Review
ing to the definition of "deceptive" and "unfair" acts or practices and the
agency's enforcement authority. Administrative agency policy always re-
flects a struggle between rationality and responsiveness.271 While the
FTC must make decisions within a framework of rationality, it also
should be responsive to the public. Responsiveness, which "connotes
sensitivity to relevant values or interests, 272 is particularly appropriate
for the FTC, as the FTC Act is perhaps an extreme example of a "politi-
cally laden mandate., 273 Even if this were not so, because "the adminis-
trative process involves value judgments ... decisions should reflect the
interplay of social interests.,
274
Providing notice and a period for public comment, together with the
agency's justification for changing previous standards, provides persons
outside the agency with the opportunity to do far more than merely try to
pressure the agency to adopt a policy which they favor. Those who agree
with the proposed new standards can identify drafting mistakes which un-
dermine the agency's ability to accomplish its objectives. Those who disa-
gree can articulate in detailed fashion their substantive objections and
support their positions with their own empirical data. The agency can
hear, not only from "interest groups" who advocate partisan positions
merely to promote the parochial needs of their own constituencies, but
also from nonpartisan organizations engaging in neutral policy analysis,
academics, and other officials with the same mission as the agency, such
as the state attorneys general. Without an opportunity to submit formal
comments, those who want to pressure the agency will find other ways to
do so, such as lobbying and voicing their views through far less informa-
tive news bytes to the media. In addition, the agency can appear far more
responsive if publication of their final policy includes a principled expla-
nation for why it rejected comments contrary to the policy ultimately
adopted.
271. See WEST, supra note 84, at 189. See generally Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that the FTC exceeded its authority
by changing existing law having widespread application by adjudication rather than
rulemaking).
272. WEST, supra note 84, at 189.
273. Id. at 199.
274. Id. at 192.
[T]he norm of responsiveness flows from the realization that administration is
more than a technocratic process-that agency mandates entail value judgments
which should be informed by the consideration of relevant social interests. If
administration is legislative in substance, then the administrative process should
be legislative as well, serving to accommodate competing demands. As means of
ensuring instrumental rationality, devices such as judicialized rulemaking proce-
dures and cost-benefit analysis inhibit such accommodation.
Id. at 195.
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Nevertheless, it would be difficult drafting an amendment to the FTC
Act requiring notice and comment prior to adopting substantive policy
changes. As the deception experience illustrates, a determined chairman
could seek to avoid such a requirement by recharacterizing a true policy
change as a mere restatement and clarification of present policy.
275
IV. THE CAMPAIGN TO REVISE THE UNFAIRNESS DOCTRINE
In a letter dated March 5, 1982, to the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation, the commissioners supported amend-
ing section 5 of the FTC Act to include a definition of unfair acts or
practices consistent with that described in the Commission's December
1980 Policy Statement.276 Commissioner Pertschuk, although agreeing
with the Policy Statement, opposed codifying it in the Act fearing it
would lead to endless litigation.277 Shortly thereafter the Republican
controlled Senate Commerce Committee held hearings.278 Miller testi
fied in favor of a statutory clarification of unfairness along the lines of the
FTC letter, or, if that were not possible, eliminating FTC jurisdiction over
unfair acts or practices involving commercial speech.279 Advertising
groups also supported eliminating the FTC's unfairness jurisdiction over
commercial speech. The United States Chamber of Commerce testified
in favor of a statutory clarification of unfairness. The National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers recommended an extension of the moratorium on
the FTC's use of its unfairness jurisdiction to promulgate rules governing
advertising.
In May 1982, Senator Robert Kasten introduced legislation which in-
corporated the FTC proposal defining unfairness and granted an exemp-
tion from the FTC's unfairness jurisdiction for all commercial
advertising.28 ° The Senate Commerce Committee approved those provi-
sions.281 Chairman Miller opposed the exemption, arguing that it was
275. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
276. See FTC's Letter to Senate Subcommittees on Bill to Restrict Agency's Jurisdiction
Over Professionals and Unfair Acts or Practices, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1055, at 570 (Mar. 11, 1982).
277. See id. at 568.
278. See Miller Suggests Revisions In Deception Standard of§ 5, supra note 176, at 628.
279. See id. at 629.
280. See Kasten Introduces Measure to Reauthorize FTC, Amend FTC Act, 42 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1063, at 978-79 (May 6, 1982).
281. See Senate Commerce Committee Approves Exemptions from FTC Jurisdiction for
Professionals, Advertisers, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1064, at 1023 (May
13, 1982). Two Republican Senators objected, charging that the bill would weaken the
public's belief in the veracity of advertising. See Senate Commerce Committee Files Report
on FTC Authorization Bill, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1067, at 1167 (June
3,1982).
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wrong to exempt any particular group which engaged in unfair acts or
practices.282 Miller acknowledged that some had charged that the FTC's
authority to police advertising under its unfairness jurisdiction was so
broad and vague that advertisers were confused about what was permit-
ted.2 83 Miller claimed that this would no longer be a problem because the
bill defined unfairness284 and a 1980 Supreme Court case clarified when
the government can regulate commercial speech.2 85 Finally, Miller ob-
jected that under the bill the scope of the term "commercial advertising"
was unclear.286 The bill also granted state-licensed professionals a com-
plete exemption from FTC antitrust and consumer protection jurisdic-
tion, to which Miller strongly objected.287 It is ironic that Miller, the
leader in the battle for deregulation, found himself attacking the Republi-
can Senate for going too far in deregulating the FTC.
Meanwhile, in the Democratic-controlled House, Congressman Florio,
Chairman of the Commerce, Transportation and Tourism Subcommittee
of the House Commerce Committee, rejected the Senate bill's provisions
on advertising as "radical., 288 The House Commerce Committee ap-
proved a bill289 that contained a definition of unfair acts or practices mir-
roring that of the Senate Commerce Committee's bill.29° The House bill,
however, contained no provision exempting commercial advertising.
The Congress finally resolved the controversy at the end of the session,
voting only to continue the moratorium begun in the FTC Improvements
Act of 1980, prohibiting the FTC from using its unfairness jurisdiction to
issue rules regulating commercial advertising.291 Miller failed to win con-
gressional approval of his proposal to codify the Commission's recom-
mended definition of unfairness, which would have restricted the FTC.
Congress did, however, ultimately agree with Miller's other proposals and
282. See Letter from James C. Miller, III, to Senator Bob Packwood, May 27, 1982,
reproduced in 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1067, at 1191 (June 3, 1982)
[hereinafter Miller Letter to Packwood, May 27, 1982].
283. See id
284. See id.
285. See id. at 1192 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980) (indicating when the government may regulate commercial
speech that is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity)).
286. See Miller Letter to Packwood, May 27, 1982, supra note 282, at 1192.
287. Id. at 1191.
288. House Subcommittee Reports Measure to Reauthorize FTC, 42 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1065, at 1071 (May 20, 1982).
289. See House Commerce Committee Advances FTC Authorization Bill With No
Amendment, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1078, at 343 (Aug. 19, 1982).
290. Compare H.R. 6995, 97th Cong. § 2 (1982) with S. 2499, 97th Cong. § 2 (1982).
291. See Appropriations Conference Committee Rejects Amendment Governing Profes-
sions, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1095, at 1121 (Dec. 23, 1982).
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defeated measures that would have narrowed the FTC's unfairness juris-
diction in regard to regulating professionals and commercial advertising.
Winning two out of three battles with Congress is quite an accomplish-
ment. It is anomalous, however, that the victories the champion of dereg-
ulation won maintained the FTC's regulatory strength.
V. THE ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM
One of Miller's prime objectives was to significantly change the Com-
mission's advertising substantiation program. 92 It is not clear, however,
exactly what Miller's objections to the program were or how he wanted
to improve it. At his first press conference, he stated that he had "'strong
reservations"' concerning the program because he believed that the re-
quirement of substantiating claims made in advertisements added to the
cost of producing the advertisements.293 He also stated his belief that
"'consumers are not as gullible as many people think." ' 194 Interestingly,
some persons from the advertising industry criticized Miller's statement.
They believed the program did not impose unreasonable burdens and, in
fact, aided the industry by giving advertisements greater credibility. 95
Miller later articulated his concerns about the program more precisely.
He stated that it was not clear from the Commission's program what
claims needed substantiation and that the Commission "read too much
into advertising claims. '296 Miller also expressed concern that the FTC
might be requiring the advertisers to produce too much data to support
their claims.
After a year of study, Miller stated that the staff needed more informa-
tion and submitted an extensive list of questions that he urged the adver-
tising industry to answer in order to provide needed information. 97 In
November 1982, Muris released his study of the advertising substantia-
tion policy.2 98 Muris did not make any recommendations in his study, but
did express the view that the FTC had at times gone too far in requiring
substantiation.
292. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
293. Miller Urges Advertising Groups to Help Reform Ad Substantiation, 43 Antitrust &





298. See Advertising Substantiation Policy Could Be Improved, FTC Official Claims, 43
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1089, at 894 (Nov. 11, 1982). Dissemination of
the Muris study illustrated Miller's increasingly isolated approach to managing the agency.
The study was not distributed to the other Commissioners prior to its release to the press.
See id.
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In March 1983, the Commission issued a public request for comments
regarding the implementation of the FTC's advertising substantiation re-
quirement.299 By October 1983, the FTC had received forty comments in
response to its request.300 Miller was disappointed that none of those
comments provided information on consumer expectations about adver-
tising.301 As a result, Miller announced that the FTC would conduct two
studies in order to obtain information about consumer expectations.30 2
Finally, in August 1984, the Commission adopted a revised statement of
its policy on advertising substantiation.30 3 The revised statement made it
clear that the FTC was still committed to requiring advertisers to have a
reasonable basis for objective claims made in their advertising.30 4 In ad-
dition, the statement established new standards for the quantity of sub-
stantiation that would be required.30 5 The revised statement did not
change previous policy, however, in requiring an advertiser to possess
adequate substantiation of claims before the claims were made in
advertising.
30 6
Miller was opposed to continuation of this policy. 307 Miller admitted
that he was not "completely happy" with this revised policy, and acknowl-
edged that his objectives in regard to changing the Commission's adver-
tising substantiation policy were only partially successful.30 8 In addition,
the move to consider and revise the policy took a great deal of time and
299. Advertising Substantiation Program, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,471 (1983).
300. Miller Returns From Tour, Addresses Advertising and Industrial Policy, 45 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1134, at 525 (Oct. 6, 1983).
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999
(1984).
304. See id. at 31,000.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 31,000-001.
307. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 39. Under certain circumstances, however, the policy
statement would grant the Commission the discretion to consider substantiation evidence
that the advertiser had developed after initial dissemination of the claim. See In re Thomp-
son Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 840 (1984).
308. MILLER, supra note 7, at 39-40. He stated:
Our analysis revealed a paucity of scholarly work directed to facets of the pro-
gram and its net consequences for businesses and consumers. Although we had
reason to believe the program generated positive net benefits, I wanted to know
more about its effects on the flow of information and consequently on competi-
tion and consumer welfare. Even with our revision I was troubled by the doc-
trine's potential for chilling the dissemination of truthful and useful information.
Much work remains to be done regarding the consequences of such a restriction
on the market for information.
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was managed in a way likely to exacerbate tensions among the
commissioners.3 °9
VI. RULEMAKING UNDER MILLER'S CHAIRMANSHIP
A. Rulemaking: Miller Triumphs By Stalling the Process
An aggressive rulemaking agenda was the hallmark of the Pertschuk
era at the FTC.31° In sharp contrast, Miller had fundamental objections
to rulemaking.311 As demonstrated by Table 11,312 Pertschuk's rulemak-
ing agenda was largely undermined during Miller's chairmanship as
Miller stalled the approval process of the many rules in the pipeline but
not promulgated at the time Pertschuk was forced out of the chairman-
ship and replaced by Miller. The continuing delays occurred despite
Miller's announcement that he had instructed the staff to speed up the
rulemaking process because he wanted the Commission to consider all
proposed rules by May 1982.313 The question remained, however, as to
why the endless delays occurred. At least three possible explanations ex-
isted: Miller poorly managed the staff; other Commission members frus-
trated Miller's efforts to accelerate consideration of proposed rules; or
the task was simply far more complex than anticipated. A final possible
explanation is that while Miller publicly espoused prompt consideration,
in reality he purposely stalled the effort.
B. The FTC's Rulemaking Authority: A Brief Historical Review
A brief historical review of the FTC's rulemaking authority provides a
perspective on the Commission's slowdown of rulemaking activity. Until
1962, the FTC did not engage in substantive rulemaking. Instead, it is-
sued Trade Practice Rules31 4 and Guides315 for voluntary compliance. In
309. See infra note 298.
310. See supra notes 1, 28 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 350-60 and accompanying text.
312. The data for Table II was gleaned from the following sources: Semiannual Regula-
tory Agenda, 49 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (1984); Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 48 Fed. Reg.
18,694 (1983); Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,120 (1983); Semiannual
Regulatory Agenda, 47 Fed. Reg. 48,924 (1982); Improving Government Regulations, 46
Fed. Reg. 54,868 (1981); FTC Publishes New Agenda Assessing Progress on Rules, 45 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1136, at 607 (Oct. 20, 1983); FTC Publishes New
Agenda Assessing Progress on Rules, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1088, at
845 (Nov. 4, 1982); FTC Releases Agenda of Regulatory Initiatives, 41 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1038, at A-23 (Nov. 5, 1981).
313. See FTC Publishes Revision of Rulemaking Timetable, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1072, at 55 (July 8, 1982).
314. See WEST, supra note 84, at 111.
315. See id. at 112.
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TABLE II
Proposed Rule











Time of Final Action Other action
11/81: final Comm. action expected by 3/82
10/83: staff recommendations expected by 11/83
4/84: staff recommendations expected by 11/84
10/84: staff recommendations expected by 11/84
11/81: final action projected for 3/82
11/82: rule approved 7/82 & sent to Congress for review
10/83: Congress's review period ended, final action effective 1/84
11/81: staff analysis expected by 6/82
11/82: staff recommendations forwarded
10/83: Comm. consideration expected by 12/82
4/84: Comm. consideration expected by 3/84
10/84: Comm. consideration expected by 1/85
11/81: staff recommendation expected by 4/82: Comm. consideration7by 6/82
7/82 staff recommendation expected by 9/82; Comm. consideration
expected by 12/82
10/83: staff recommendation expected by 12/83
10/84: staff recommendation expected by 3/85
11/81: staff recommendation expected by 2/82; Comm. consideration
expected by 4/82
7/82: staff recommendation expected by 7/82; Comm. consideration
expected by 11/2
11/82: staff makes recommendation; Comm. consideration expected
/81:9/83
final Comm. consideration expected by 3/84
11/81: staff report expected by 7/82
7/82: staff report expected by 2/83
4/83: staff report expected by 3/84
4/84: staff report expected by 6/84
10/84: staff report expected by 9/84
11/81: Comm. action expected by 2/82
11/82: staff recommendation expected by 12/82
4/83: Comm. consideration expected by 6/83
10/83: Comm. consideration expected by 3/84
10/84: Comm. consideration expected by 10/84
11/81: Comm. considers rule
4/83: Comm. calls for further staff analysis expected by 12/83
10/83: staff's analysis expected by 3/84
4/84: staff analysis expected by 3/84
10/84: staff analysis expected by 9/84
7/82: under consideration by Comm. after Congress's rejection
11/82: Comm. to consider alternatives in 10/82
4/83: Comm. consideration of alternatives postponed to 12/83
10/83: ltigation pending in Second Circuit
4/84: staff recommendation expected by 5/84
10/84: final Comm. consideration expected by 9/84
1962, the Agency began promulgating substantive rules which it called
Trade Regulation Rules (TRRs).316 The FTC did so despite a lack of
explicit statutory authority. The FTC justified issuing TRRs in several
ways. First, it argued the agency had implicit authority to issue TRRs
because the statute required the FTC to prevent unfair and deceptive
practices.317 Adjudication did nothing to prevent these practices directly;
rather, it provided remedies in individual cases after the fact. Second, the
FTC contended that since it had the power to establish substantive rules
316. See id.
317. See id. at 113.
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in the course of deciding cases by adjudication, it also had the power to
establish such rules through TRRs.318 Third, the FTC claimed section
6(g) of the FTC Act granted the authority to promulgate rules.31 9
TRRs can be justified on policy grounds as well. A TRR allows the
FTC to "treat entire industries equitably" instead of "arbitrarily singling
out individuals" for adjudication.32 ° The industry subject to the TRR,
and anyone else, has the opportunity to comment on a proposed TRR,
which ensures that the FTC has before it information from sources be-
yond its own agency and that it is exposed to the point of view of the
industry affected.321 A TRR provides guidance that enables a company
to plan future action. 322 This is superior to adjudication, which deals with
problems piecemeal over a long period of time, because the agency can
decide only the issues before it in each individual case. Further, TRRs
allow the Commission to combat unfair and deceptive practices in a com-
prehensive fashion by dealing with an entire industry and focusing on a
broad range of practices used by that industry.
William F. West offers an additional "political" reason for the FTC's
willingness to issue TRRs in the early 1960s. Before that time, the only
constituents paying attention to the FTC were the companies the FTC's
activities affected.323 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, consum-
ers became better informed and increasingly active.
324
Lacking clear legislative authority to issue TRRs, at first the FTC
promulgated relatively trivial rules.325  Apparently emboldened, the
agency then issued a rule requiring health warnings on cigarette pack-
ages.326 The tobacco industry complained to Congress, and the FTC rule
was replaced with a much milder rule. 327 As a result, the FTC lost its
nerve and returned to issuing rules of little consequence.328 In 1969, the
American Bar Association (ABA) and a Ralph Nader group issued sepa-
318. See id.
319. See id. Section 6(g) provides that the FTC can "make rules and regulations for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act." Id. Others argued that this provision
applied only to "rules of internal practice and procedure." Id.
320. Id. at 114.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See id. at 118.
324. See id. at 117. "The rise of consumerism gave the agency a viable alternative
source of political support which enabled it to take a more aggressive regulatory stance."
Id. at 118.
325. See id. at 119.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 120.
328. See id.
1997]
Catholic University Law Review
rate reports sharply critical of the Commission's lack of aggressiveness.329
The FTC responded to the political pressure these reports generated by
issuing significant rules such as the one regulating door-to-door sales.33
These rules broke new ground, rather than merely codifying FTC case
law and industry practice, and often imposed substantial costs upon af-
fected companies. 331 Industry then attacked the FTC's authority to pro-
mulgate these rules.
332
The political pressure resulting from the ABA and Nader reports led
Congress to consider a FTC bill which eventually included explicit
rulemaking authority.333 Industry opposed this provision, arguing that
the bill granted the FTC too much power to regulate entire industries
under the rubric of preventing "'unfair and deceptive practices,"' a tre-
mendously vague standard.334 Industry criticized rulemaking as unre-
sponsive to changing circumstances, and favored the common law
approach of adjudication. 335 Congress rejected industry's position and
enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act.336 Not only did the legislation grant the FTC rulemaking
authority, but it also authorized the FTC to provide funding to consumer
groups to allow them to intervene in rulemaking proceedings.337 While
appearing to be a clear victory for consumers and a strong expression of
congressional support for the FTC, West points out that the statute was
actually a compromise. While granting rulemaking authority, the statute
imposed strict procedural rules which prevented the FTC from becoming
too aggressive.338
After the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Act, the FTC embarked
on an ambitious program to propose many new rules-rules that were
comprehensive and adopted a wide variety of strategies to combat unfair
and deceptive practices.339 Within five years of enactment of the statute,
the Commission proposed twenty new rules and amendments to the old
rules.340 The FTC broke new ground in proposing rules which were
329. See id.
330. See id. at 121.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 122.
334. Id. at 123.
335. See id.
336. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1994).
337. See WEST, supra note 84, at 124.
338. See id. at 125-39.
339. See id. at 146 (comparing the Commission's rulemaking activity before and after
the enactment of the Magnusson-Moss Act).
340. See id.
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based on unfair practices, such as the funeral industry practices rule and
the proposed regulation of children's advertising.341 Business groups
mounted a strong attack against the FTC's rulemaking. 42 In the late
1970s, Congress, which had been so willing to side with consumer inter-
ests in passing Magnuson-Moss, began to impose restrictions upon the
FTC's rulemaking powers. For example, the Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act of 1980 required the FTC to submit final TRRs to
Congress, which could then review them and exercise a legislative veto.343
Congress used that veto power to nullify the Commission's Used Car
Rule.3' The Supreme Court, however, subsequently held the legislative
veto unconstitutional. 31 In addition, the Improvements Act of 1980
imposed stringent procedural requirements relating to the FTC's rule-
making procedures. 346 That statute also prevented the Commission from
using the unfairness doctrine as the basis for regulating advertising for
three years347 and prohibited the Commission from regulating children's
advertising.
This brief review of the history of rulemaking prior to Miller becoming
chairman illustrates that for most of its history, the FTC has not engaged
in an aggressive rulemaking program and has always been very much sub-
ject to political pressures from Congress and business interests. It would
be erroneous to claim that in stalling adoption of final trade regulation
rules, Miller was defying a clear mandate from Congress to push strongly
ahead and enact many comprehensive rules. By sending a mixed
message, Congress shares much of the responsibility for the lack of vigor-
ous activity by the Commission. On the one hand, Congress passed the
Magnuson-Moss Act granting the FTC express authority to issue TRRs
and urged the Commission to promulgate rules relating to children's ad-
vertising and funeral practices.348 On the other hand, Congress has,
through actions such as the 1980 Act, given the agency the clear message
that it had gone too far. When the FTC followed Congress's suggestions
341. See id. at 147-48 (illustrating the FTC's willingness to go beyond traditional con-
structions of the FrC Act).
342. See id. at 151 (noting some of the businesses that attracted the FTC's policies).
343. See id. at 152.
344. See id.
345. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
346. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 252, 94
Stat. 374 (1980); see also WEST, supra note 84, at 152.
347. See WEST, supra note 84, at 153-54 (noting that Congress worked to constrain FTC
rulemaking in other ways).
348. See id. at 156.
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relating to children's advertising and funeral practices, Congress then had
a change of heart and criticized the agency for its proposed rules.349
Nevertheless, the FTC's slowdown on rulemaking procedures was con-
sistent with Chairman Miller's own ideological predisposition. While
Miller addressed the need for "rational and coherent rules for business
behavior, 35 ° he also stated "that detailed rules, poorly articulated or
poorly enforced, can be worse than no rules at all.",35 1 More fundamen-
tally, however, Miller disliked the rulemaking process. He favored the
common law adjudicatory approach to solving problems in the market-
place.352 He preferred the common law approach because he believed it
was consistent with his goal of improving "the functioning of markets...
by enforcing an efficient set of institutional rules that structure market
transactions. ' 353 He further noted that "an efficient structure is one that
allows buyers and sellers jointly to maximize the net value of their ex-
changes, after taking into account the costs of transacting. ' 354 His prefer-
ence for common law adjudication over rulemaking, therefore, was
directly connected to his preference for an economic approach. Miller
believed an economic approach was superior to what he regarded as the
ethical approach which the FTC had adopted prior to his administra-
tion.355 He claimed an economic approach gives "one a sense of limits
and provides much better standards for judgment and evaluation.,
35 6
Miller believed that there was nothing "necessarily contradictory or con-
flicting" between an ethical theory of consumer protection and an eco-
nomic theory of consumer protection.357 Indeed, he said, "I know of
nothing that clearly belongs within the legitimate core of an ethical the-
ory of consumer protection that would not also be found in an economic
conception of the same topic. '358 As a result, he believed that "in many,
if not most, areas the policy implications are the same.,
35 9
349. See id.
350. MILLER, supra note 7, at 3.
351. Id. at 8.
352. See id. at 11-13 (explaining the Commission's role in enforcing common law
principles).
353. Id. at 11.
354. Id.
355. See id. at 24-25 (explaining that an economic approach provides better standards
for objectively evaluating an ethical approach).
356. Id. at 25.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. Pertschuk claimed that Reagan's appointees used "economics as a 'veneer' to
disguise hidden biases and value judgments." Pertschuk Reviews Regulators' Principles of
New Economics, supra note 171, at 619. He claimed they ignored "'human misery and
suffering, greed and avarice."' Id.
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In discussing his proposed definition of unfair and deceptive practices,
Miller stated his rationale for favoring common law adjudication over
rulemaking:
We believed that a statute based on economic principles would
eliminate many of the difficulties the commission had suffered in
the past. With virtually boundless authority, the commission
had been prone to take on whole industries through the rules it
made, disciplining innocent and guilty alike, without sufficient
concern for the effects on those regulated and on consumers.
Although this attitude appeared more often in proposals than in
final actions, the threat caused considerable bitterness among
business people and led to congressional attacks that resulted in
the commission's shutting down for a time. Perhaps more im-
portant, it diverted work toward the multiplication of anecdotal
horror stories and away from serious analysis of real problems
and possible solutions.
360
As this quote indicates, Miller justified his preference for adjudication
over rulemaking in terms of economics, bitterness, protection from
outside pressures exerted by industry and Congress, and administrative
efficiency.
C. Illustrative Rulemaking Proceedings
1. Food Advertising
An examination of the FTC's actions in regard to three proposed rules
provides further insights into the approach of Miller and his staff direc-
tors. In 1974, the Commission began work on a rule governing food ad-
vertising.361 The Commission approved the staff's proposed rule in
1980.362 By 1982, the FTC still had not promulgated a final rule and
Timothy Muris, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection for the
FTC, recommended that the Commission terminate its proceedings on
the rule.3 63 Muris defended his recommendation by stating his approach
to FTC rulemaking. He maintained "'a general presumption against gov-
ernment mandated changes in established practices.' ' 364 In addition, he
stated that the Commission should entertain "'a heavy presumption that
markets work... [w]hen there is substantial evidence that market forces
cannot eliminate actions that significantly injure consumers and substan-
360. MILLER, supra note 7, at 25.
361. See Muris Urges FTC Commissioners to Drop Food Ad Rulemaking, End Labeling
Rule Extension, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1069, at 1262 (June 17, 1982).
362. See id.
363. See id. at 1261.
364. Id.
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tial evidence that the Commission's remedy will improve consumers' well
being, the Commission should act.' 365 Muris would not rely upon anec-
dotal evidence, but would instead require "methodologically sound
surveys.'366 Not only would he require proof that the benefits would out-
weigh the costs, but also that the "'proposed remedy [would be] likely to
work.' "367
Muris then applied his standards for rulemaking to the food advertising
proposal. This proposed rule required advertisements to provide certain
information relating to cholesterol, fatty acids, claims that food provide
energy, claims that food is low in calories and that a product is "natu-
ral."'368 According to Muris, the evidence in the record did not suffi-
ciently prove that consumers failed to understand the claims made in
advertisements and thus were injured.369 He also declared that it would
be so costly to comply with the proposed rule, that the benefits probably
did not outweigh the costs. Muris, therefore, suggested that the Commis-
sion instead use a case-by-case adjudicatory approach.
Muris's staff disagreed with this approach to rulemaking as well as its
application to the food advertising rule. His staff claimed "that Muris'
demand for statistically projectable consumer surveys '[was] unduly re-
strictive, inflexible, and legally inappropriate.' To satisfy Muris, the staff
predicted, would require four studies costing $75,000 each."-37 ° While
conceding that the record was not as definitive as one might wish, the
staff claimed that there was sufficient evidence showing that consumers
were likely to be misled by present advertising claims in the areas cov-
ered by the proposed rule.37 1
Finally, at the end of 1982, the Commission decided to terminate its
rulemaking proceeding on the proposed food advertising rule.
372 Com-
missioner Clanton, who originally voted in favor of authorizing the staff
to prepare the rule, cast the deciding vote.3 73 Clanton developed a grow-
ing skepticism about the usefulness of broad rules.374 In regard to the
food advertising proposal, he came to believe that consumers' concerns
365. Id.




370. FTC Delays Food Rule Meeting; Staffs Recommendations Differ, 43 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1094, at 1085 (Dec. 16, 1982).
371. See id.
372. See FTC Junks Food Rule; Clanton's Change of Mind Results in Tie Votes at Table,
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were not sufficiently widespread to justify the rule. 75 Clanton suggested
the Commission monitor the situation and act on a case-by-case adjudica-
tion basis.376 Commissioner Bailey responded by noting that the FTC
originally began considering adoption of a rule because of its dissatisfac-
tion with trying to resolve this issue on a case-by-case basis.3 77
2. Funeral Industry Practices
The Commission's debate over its rule governing funeral industry prac-
tices also illustrates the split within the Commission on the appropriate-
ness of rulemaking and the standards for such action. In July, 1982, in a
three-to-one vote, the Commission approved the Funeral Practice Rule,
with Chairman Miller in opposition.378 Miller claimed that the record no
longer supported the rule because of a new survey which indicated that
only six percent of consumers who requested price information were de-
nied that information. 379 Muris joined Miller in claiming that this study
would make the rule subject to being held invalid if challenged in
court.38° Pertschuk, however, attacked Muris's approach to what evi-
dence was necessary to justify rulemaking. According to Pertschuk,
Muris required "'a series of clinically elegant, massive, and definitive sta-
tistical surveys of nationally projectable probability samples to confirm
the findings we have already made based upon the less pure rough and
tumble of testimony, cross-examination, comments, and numerous stud-
ies.'''381 Pertschuk further characterized Muris's position as requiring the
disapproval of "'any conceivable theory that might demonstrate [funeral
industry] behavior to be benign.' 382 Pertschuk argued that if the Com-
mission waited for the "perfect proof' prior to rulemaking, it "'may well
wait forever.'
3 83
Commissioner Bailey also criticized Muris's reliance upon the survey,
concluding that when consumers asked for price information, they almost
always were provided with it.384 She argued that Muris's approach com-
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make decisions regarding funeral arrangements and expenses.385 She felt
that the Commission should rely on the information in the record which
showed that funeral directors do not focus on the price of the goods and
services they are selling, but rather sell an entire package of goods and
services without itemizing the cost of individual items.386 Far from being
a team player, Miller continued to oppose the rule, stating at a press con-
ference several months later that if he were in Congress, he would veto
the rule.387
3. Credit Practices Rule
The dynamics that resulted in the unanimous promulgation of the
Credit Practices Rule provide a contrast to the divisiveness of the process
resulting in the Funeral Industry Rule. The enactment of the Credit Prac-
tices Rule demonstrated that the Commission was able to work together
in a collegial, if not congenial, fashion to hammer out a compromise not
altogether satisfying to any commissioner, but containing significant sub-
stantive provisions. Unlike his dogged refusal to accept the Funeral In-
dustry Rule, Miller reluctantly joined the other commissioners and voted
to approve the Credit Practices Rule. The approval of the rule also was
very much the result of changes over time, political pressures, negotia-
tion, and compromise.
During eight years of investigation and research, the staff compiled a
record consisting of approximately 500,000 pages.388 Under Miller's ad-
ministration, the directors of both the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion and the Bureau of Economics opposed the rule. Muris proposed
terminating the rule.389 FTC sources gave the rule "'a snow ball's chance
in hell"' of being adopted.39° In addition to opposition from the direc-
tors, Reagan appointees, Miller and Douglas, were expected to oppose
the rule, whereas Pertschuk and Bailey favored the rule.39 1 The future of
the rule, therefore, was in the hands of David Clanton, a Ford appointee.
Given this split in the positions of the Commissioners, negotiations en-
sued. Clanton voted in favor of a rule prohibiting six types of contract
385. See id.
386. See id. at 272-73.
387. See FTC Chairman Places Blame for Political Problems on Legacy of Past, supra
note 155, at 769.
388. See FTC Staff Is Divided Over Proposed Credit Practices Rule, 44 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1112, at 879 (Apr. 28, 1983).
389. See id. at 880.
390. Id. at 879.
391. See Clanton Holds Swing Vote in Impending FTC Decision on Credit Rule, 44 An-
titrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1118, at 1117 (June 9, 1983) [hereinafter Clanton
Holds Swing Vote].
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provisions, but also proposed that the staff prepare disclosure statements
so the Commission could consider requiring such statements instead of
instituting an outright ban.3" Miller and Douglas preferred Clanton's
disclosure proposal over a ban.393 Immediate action was necessary for
the commissioners to achieve a compromise. The Commission worked
during the summer of 1983 to reach an agreement before a deadline of
September 26, 1983, when Clanton's term would expire. In addition,
political pressure influenced the compromise process because the Repub-
lican Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee strongly opposed the
rule.394 By the third week of July 1983, when the Commission next met
to consider the rule, Clanton decided that disclosure statements could not
protect consumers from overreaching creditors.395 Consequently, Miller
lacked the votes either to kill the rule or to eviscerate it by requiring
disclosure statements. Instead of voting in opposition, both Miller and
Douglas voted with the others, and the rule passed unanimously. 396 The
commissioners believed that timing was still a problem, however, because
the rule could not be enacted until the Commission approved a statement
of basis and purpose for the rule. Proponents feared if approval was
delayed until Clanton's term expired, the compromise that created the
rule could fall apart.397 To dissuade Miller from delaying the rule's final
promulgation, fifteen Democratic congressmen sent a letter to Miller urg-
ing prompt action.398
It is not apparent why the five commissioners, with substantially differ-
ing views, arrived at a compromise on the Credit Practices Rule when
they clashed bitterly and were dead-locked on other matters. The
agency's compromise may be attributed to the Commission's structure.
392. See Commission Switches Gears During Credit Rule Debates, 44 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1119, at 1164 (June 16, 1983). Clanton's role in keeping the pro-
posed rule alive is surprising, given his growing hostility to industry-wide rules as illus-
trated by his views relating to the proposed food advertising rule. See supra notes 373-76
and accompanying text.
393. See Commission Switches Gears During Credit Rule Debates, supra note 392, at
1164.
394. See Clanton Holds Swing Vote, supra note 391, at 1118.
395. See FTC Okays Consumer Credit Rule, Bars Certain Collection Practices, 45 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1124, at 87 (July 21, 1983). The commission did adopt
a disclosure statement requirement in notices to co-signers. See id. at 86.
396. See id. Commissioner Clanton rejected the co-signer notice requirement. See id.
397. See 15 House Democrats Praise FTC for Action on Credit Rule, 45 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1128, at 276 (Aug. 18, 1983). The proponents' fears were
unjustified. The commissioners had difficulty in agreeing on the statement of basis and
purpose, which prevented a final vote on the rule until February, 1984, by which time Terry
Calvani had replaced Clanton. Calvani did not participate in the rulemaking debates and
did not vote. All of the other commissioners approved the rule on the final vote.
398. See id.
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When promulgating a TRR, the FTC works toward completing the job
Congress and the President started by passing a law containing a vague
general standard. It is therefore fitting that the FTC works within a struc-
ture allowing it to engage in the same give-and-take that Congress and
the President experience. In the case of the Credit Practices Rule, that
structure guaranteed the rule would be considered within an institutional
context conducive to compromise. In contrast, if there were a single ad-
ministrator of the FTC instead of a commission, and if we assume past
chairmen would have been the administrator, Pertschuk may have
promulgated a much stronger rule. However, Congress likely would have
responded to a stronger Credit Practices Rule with preemptive legisla-
tion. Similarly, Miller may have simply repealed the rule if he were the
administrator.
D. Miller's Reluctance in Rulemaking
As we have seen, Miller preferred adjudication over rulemaking, in
part, because he believed that Congress and industry attempted to pres-
sure FTC rulemaking efforts.399 Miller's position seems to suggest that
the FTC should avoid rulemaking brought on by substantial pressure
from outside sources. But if the FTC refuses to act under those circum-
stances, one must question why Congress established the FTC as an "in-
dependent" agency. Several years after leaving the Commission, Miller
expressed his views on the effectiveness of independent agencies. Miller
complained that "appointees to independent agencies are fair game for
congressional theatrics and their supporters in the media."400 Rather
than being a target for Congress in the media, Miller stated, "I believe it
would be wise to eliminate completely the distinction afforded independ-
ent agencies. The executive as well as adjudicatory functions of in-
dependent agencies can be accomplished perfectly well by executive
officials serving at the pleasure of the President."' ' Miller complained
that Congress dominated the independent agencies. 40 To avoid congres-
sional dominance in rulemaking and even less formal policymaking,
Miller proposed that the President have control over the independent
agencies.40 3 Miller felt extremely vulnerable as the head of an independ-
399. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
400. Symposium, Independent Agencies-Independent From Whom?, 41 ADMIN. L.
REV. 491, 503 (1989) [hereinafter Independent Agencies].
401. Id.
402. See id. at 504.
403. See id. at 505. Miller stated:
I think the President and/or his assigns should have complete authority to direct
the independent agencies. For example, if the President called up and said to the
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ent agency subject to congressional oversight. He regretted "[b]eing
outside the shelter and protection afforded by the President. ''4°4 This
feeling of vulnerability and desire for presidential protection explained
Miller's reluctance to resort to rulemaking which would subject him to
congressional attack.
While it is understandable that Miller would feel this way, Professor
Peter Strauss has explained that the modem reality of governing makes
congressional oversight more crucial than ever. Strauss explains that be-
cause Congress is presented with tremendously complex problems it has
resorted to establishing processes rather than directly participating in
problem solving.405 Because it cannot directly participate in the rule-
making process, Congress feels a need to oversee the agencies to which it
has delegated power to insure that they are adequately carrying out their
duties. Miller's proposal to end agencies' independence to protect their
heads from congressional attack is not responsive to Congress's continu-
ing need to exercise oversight.
It is apparent, however, that Miller's objection to rulemaking goes far
deeper than the Commission's reluctance to face criticism from industry
and Congress. As demonstrated in the previous discussion of the pro-
posed food advertising rule and the funeral industry rule, Miller had fun-
damental objections to marketplace regulation through rulemaking. He
clearly preferred adjudication on a case-by-case basis to permit the law to
develop in a manner comparable to the way the courts develop the com-
mon law. In light of this preference, Miller's lack of forthrightness in his
approach to rulemaking certainly may be called into question. Rather
than endlessly stalling the rulemaking process, arguably he should have
attempted to terminate the rulemaking proceedings on several rules, as
he did for the food advertising rule. Instead, Miller engaged in the cha-
rade of continually postponing rulemaking completion deadlines. These
stalling techniques are comparable to the approach he took when issuing
the new rules on deception. He claimed that the rules did not change
current law, but merely restated the present interpretation of those rules.
Likewise, in regard to rulemaking, instead of forthrightly calling for a halt
to the many rules that he apparently objected to, he purported to move
FTC, you've got this deception standard before you and I think you should tailor
it in such and such a way, I would feel obligated to carry out his wishes.
Id.
404. Id. at 503. According to Professor Robinson, a President has little incentive to
become involved in agency decisionmaking. See Robinson, supra note 10, at 248. Other
research suggests the President does exert influence over agencies including the FTC. See
generally Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM.
J. POL. SCi. 197 (1982).
405. See Independent Agencies, supra note 400, at 520.
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forward when he most likely intended to insure that the rules never
would be enacted.
This lack of forthrightness was not necessarily a bad strategy. Calling
for the termination of ongoing rulemaking proceedings when he did not
possess a majority of the votes to bring about the termination would have
undermined Miller's authority. On the other hand, Miller assumed office
with clearly stated goals, promising a strong management style which,
presumably, would exclude saying one thing while meaning and doing
something quite different. It is questionable whether one can be a strong
leader if one engages in that type of conduct.
VII. THE PROMISE OF AGGRESSIVE ADJUDICATION
Although Miller showed tremendous reluctance to lead an aggressive
rulemaking program to address consumer protection, he had promised to
embark on an aggressive program to adjudicate serious cases of consumer
fraud. An example of this new focus occurred one year after Miller be-
came chairman. For the first time, the FTC began recording phone con-
versations its investigators engaged in with persons allegedly using
deceptive practices to sell oil and gas leases.4" 6 Miller had not only criti-
cized widespread rulemaking proceedings, but he also had criticized past
FTC adjudicatory actions in what he regarded as gray areas not involving
serious instances of consumer fraud. Under Miller's leadership, there-
fore, the Commission embarked on an effort to bring cases involving
what was characterized as "hard-core fraud."4 °7
Other cases also showed that the Miller FTC might continue aggressive
enforcement activity. For example, after receiving many complaints from
consumer groups, the media, and automobile dealers, the FTC launched a
campaign against deceptive car advertisements that offered low interest
rates but omitted crucial buyer qualification requirements, as well as
other lending restrictions.40 8 In response, the FTC sent letters to those
automobile dealers who issued the advertisements asking-for voluntary
compliance.40 9 In addition, the FTC informed Better Business Bureaus
nationwide that it was investigating these advertisements and drafted a
new fact sheet to assist consumers who might be purchasing
automobiles.410 Amanda Pedersen, Deputy Director of the Bureau of
406. See FTC Will Record Conversations to Get Evidence in Gas Lease Swindles, 43
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1086, at 774 (Oct. 21, 1982).
407. Id.
408. See FTC Begins Investigation of Misleading Ads for Auto Credit, 44 Antitrust &
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Consumer Protection, expressed the FTC's view that consumer education
was essential to consumer protection.411 She defended the Commission's
use of voluntary compliance letters rather than immediately commencing
enforcement proceedings by explaining it was hoped that many of the
dealers who used the advertisements were acting honestly, but in igno-
rance of FTC requirements.412
An FTC investigation of Truth in Lending advertising violations by
homebuilders and real estate brokers discovered that compliance with the
Truth in Lending Act was very low in certain cities. The Commission
embarked on a program that targeted sixteen cities. 413 Whereas, in the
past, the FTC would have instituted enforcement proceedings against
those companies violating the Act, the Miller FTC first sought voluntary
compliance.414 The Commission claimed that this program was highly
successful in substantially raising the compliance levels of the firms
targeted. Miller stated that the purpose of the program was "education
instead of prosecution., 415 Those found in violation of the Act were con-
tacted by letter and phone, and informed of their violations.416 The Com-
mission also distributed a booklet explaining how to comply with the
Truth in Lending Act in consumer credit advertisements. 417
On the one hand, one could criticize the Commission's efforts as weak
because the Commission did not receive any written consent agreements.
The names of the firms in violation of Truth in Lending were not publi-
cized as they would have been in formal FTC proceedings. On the other
hand, one could argue this was a far more efficient method of assuring
compliance with Truth in Lending. The FTC's efforts directly reached
1,300 companies in sixteen cities. Separate enforcement actions against
even a fraction of that number of firms would have taken far more re-
sources than the FTC possessed. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of volun-
tary programs cannot be ascertained without periodic follow-up studies to
determine whether there was continued compliance. Unfortunately, the
FTC lacked the resources to institute systematic follow-up investigations
411. See id. at 643.
412. See id. at 642.
413. See FTC Touts Success of Voluntary TILA Compliance, 44 Antitrust & ftade Reg.




417. See id. The federal publication was entitled How to Advise Consumer Credit. See
id.
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to determine whether its voluntary program had resulted in long-term
deterrence.41 8
The above FTC initiatives illustrate that aggressive enforcement pro-
ceedings in the Miller years often meant resorting to voluntary compli-
ance measures. Such actions should be considered along with other cases
indicating a weakening of enforcement resolve. For example, in the case
of In re Kroger Co., 41 the FTC modified its prior order by substantially
cutting back on its compliance requirements.420 The Commission had
found that Kroger's advertising of lower prices was based on inadequate
methodological surveys and was structured to favor Kroger over its com-
petitors. Pertschuk attacked the modified order, characterizing it as "an
illusory order.",421 He believed that the record supported the original or-
der.422 He also objected to the provision in the modified order which
included a two-year sunset clause limiting the duration of those require-
ments which still remained in the revised order.423 Pertschuk was partic-
ularly concerned with the order because Kroger had conducted an
internal survey indicating the true comparison of prices.424 Thus, Kroger
had information in its records revealing that its advertised survey prices
were different from its own internal survey.
In the cases of In re Sterling Drug, Inc.425 and In re Bristol-Meyers
Co. ,426 the Commission found the advertising claims made by these com-
panies to be deceptive. The Commission required that the companies
support the advertising of their products' superior results with two well-
controlled clinical tests. 427 In rendering its decision, however, the Com-
mission overruled part of its prior substantiation doctrine as established
in In re American Home Products Corp.428 American Home Products
had set forth a far easier standard for triggering the two clinical tests
requirement.
Another case indicating that the FTC under Miller might not be acting
as aggressively as prior commissions is In re Encyclopedia Britannica,
418. Bank officers acknowledged that even in 1996, lenders often did not comply with
the Truth in Lending Act. See Jaret Seiberg, Bankers Seen Stumbling Through a Mine
Field of Advertising Regulations, AM. BANKER, Mar. 28, 1996, at 18.
419. 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982).
420. See id. at 573-75.
421. Id. at 575 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting).
422. See id.
423. See id. at 577-78.
424. See id. at 576.
425. 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983).
426. 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983).
427. See In re Bristol-Meyers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 391-92 (1983); In re Sterling Drugs,
Inc. 102 F.T.C. 395, 804-05 (1983).
428. 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), affd, 695 F.2d 681 (3rd Cir. 1982).
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Inc.,429 a 1982 case in which the FTC modified an order issued in 1976.
The revised order loosened the requirement that the company's salesmen
inform consumers of the true purpose of their visit.4 3° In addition, the
revised order cut back on what the company had to disclose to perspec-
tive employees at their initial interview.
431
It is difficult to determine whether some of the Commission's other
decisions represent a weak FTC enforcement program or a strong one.
For example, in In re General Motors Corp. ,432 the Commission ordered
General Motors to set up a nationwide arbitration program for automo-
bile purchasers who had complaints about their cars' engine and trans-
mission performances.433 Consumer groups and the state attorneys
general opposed the arbitration program.434 Pertschuk objected to indi-
vidual case-by-case arbitration in a situation such as this where a common
defect was involved. He asserted, "The only rational and equitable rem-
edy for the common injury suffered in a case like this is automatic com-
pensation for damages, not standardless mini-trials pitting individual
consumers against the largest company in the world!, 435 He noted that
the case had led to the formation of several consumer groups that organ-
ized consumers who purchased the General Motors cars involved in the
proceeding and that drafted and distributed self-help arbitration manuals
to the car owners.436 Commissioner Bailey filed a separate statement,
writing that the settlement would have been more acceptable if it pro-
vided for direct redress.437 Despite its flaws, Bailey found that the settle-
ment was the best that could be obtained with General Motors' consent,
and at least would provide "immediate, fair, and certain means of com-
pensating" the owners of the cars in question.438
429. 100 F.T.C. 500 (1982).
430. See id. at 500-05.
431. The FrC had a great deal of difficulty determining the appropriate remedies in
this case. The FrC modified its order against the company three times within a period of
eight years. See In re Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 111 F.T.C. 1, 23-25 (1988) (Oliver,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
432. 102 F.T.C. 1741 (1983).
433. See id. at 1761-62.
434. See id. at 1743 (Pertschuk, separate statement).
435. Id. at 1744 (Pertschuk, separate statement).
436. See id.
437. See id. at 1745 (Bailey, separate statement). Carol Crawford, Director of the FTC
Bureau of Consumer Protection, opined that it was not clear that the Commission would
prevail if the case went to court. See FTC Approves Settlement of GM Automobile Defect
Case, 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1141, at 843 (Nov. 24, 1983).
438. In re General Motors Corp., 102 F.T.C. at 1741, 1745 (1983) (Bailey, separate
statement).
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Commissioner Douglas also filed a separate statement, explaining his
understanding of the circumstances under which the Commission could
grant consumers direct relief.4 39 He stated that the Commission had ob-
tained direct consumer redress only in those cases where the company
agreed to it during a negotiation process. 440 Douglas believed that the
Commission had no power to order direct redress administratively. 441
From these statements it appears that at least three of the Commission-
ers did not regard the arbitration portion of the consent order in General
Motors as an indication of vigorous FTC enforcement. Rather, it was the
optimum resolution of the case in order to avoid many years of litigation
and probable appeals.
Miller's most important litigation victory was the Commission's incor-
poration of its 1983 deception policy statement into FTC case law in In re
Cliffdale Associates, InC.4 42 In the opinion, Chairman Miller claimed that
the elements of the deception standard contained in the 1983 policy state-
ment thoroughly spelled out "the factors actually used in most earlier
Commission cases identifying whether or not an act or practice was de-
ceptive, even though the language used in those cases was often couched
in such terms as 'a tendency and capacity to deceive.' ' 3 Miller criticized
the "tendency and capacity" test as "circular and therefore inadequate to
provide guidance." 4' Miller then applied the new test to the facts of
Cliffdale and ruled that the record supported a finding of deception.445
Commissioner Pertschuk objected to Miller's adoption of the new de-
ception standard, arguing that the new standard departed significantly
from the old standard. 446 Commissioner Bailey filed a separate state-
ment, declaring, "I must disassociate myself from the confusing and
wholly unorthodox reformulation of the traditional test for finding decep-
tion., 447 She noted that in this case the 1983 policy statement was being
439. See id. at 1745 (Douglas, separate statement).
440. See id. at 1747.
441. See id. For the Commission to obtain direct consumer redress absent a negotiated
settlement, the Commission would have to first file an administrative complaint. If that
was successful, the Commission would have to litigate a second case in federal court and
prove that General Motors "had acted dishonestly and fraudulently with respect to each
component." Id. at 1748.
442. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
443. Id. at 165 (citing Sears Roebuck and Co., 95 F.T.C. 406 (1980), affd, 676 F.2d 385
(9th Cir. 1982)).
444. Id. at 164.
445. See id. at 166. The October 14, 1983 letter to Congressman Dingell regarding the
FTC's enforcement of its deception policy was attached as an appendix to this opinion. See
id. at 174-84.
446. See id. at 185 (Pertschuk, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
447. Id. at 189 (Bailey, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
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pronounced "not just [as] current agency enforcement policy, but also the
legal standard for future Commission deception cases.""' 8 She argued at
length that the new deception policy was a substantial departure from
prior law. She claimed that although the policy statement purported to
protect vulnerable groups of consumers, it was "analytically unsuited for
such purposes.""' 9
In subsequent cases, the Commission applied the deception standard
from -the 1983 policy statement as incorporated in the Cliffdale deci-
sion.45° The policy statement, however, continued to be a source of con-
tention among the commissioners. For example, in In re Southwest
Sunsites, Inc. ,451 Bailey applied the Cliffdale deception standard.452 In a
footnote, however, she insisted that she still did "not endorse the use of
this standard." '453 She noted that the respondent's conduct in the case
before her violated both the old and the new deception standards.454
Miller's success in changing the law of deception was confirmed as fed-
eral courts began applying the Cliffdale standard. This was a remarkable
victory because prior to the adoption of the 1983 policy statement in
Cliffdale, no court had interpreted the deception standard as expressed in
the policy statement. Moreover, the new standard was issued in the form
of a letter to a congressional committee, rather than being published in
draft form with an opportunity for public comment. These factors did not
deter the Ninth Circuit, which found that "[t]he new standard became
binding on the FTC when it was adopted in Cliffdale Associates, Inc. ,
455
The Ninth Circuit formally adopted the Cliffdale deception standard in
the subsequent case of Federal Trade Commission v. Pantron I Corp. ,456
without any discussion of whether this standard was a substantial depar-
ture from the old standard or any potential differences in application be-
tween the two standards.
The court in Federal Trade Commission v. Amy Travel Service, Inc.
4 57
found that the new standard did not differ substantially from the old.458
It supported this conclusion by quoting from the decision in Cliffdale, in
448. Id. at 189 n.1.
449. Id. at 195.
450. See, e.g., In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 818 (1984).
451. 105 F.T.C. 7 (1985), affd, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986).
452. See id. at 147 n.79.
453. Id.
454. See id.
455. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1986).
456. 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794 (1995).
457. No. 87-C 6776, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13371 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1988).
458. See id. at *41.
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which the majority claimed that the elements in the new standard were
actually used in most earlier Commission cases, even though terms such
as "tendency and capacity to deceive" were used instead of the language
of the new standard.459 The court ignored the arguments made by the
dissenting Commissioners in Cliffdale, which contended that there were
very substantial differences in the meanings of the words used in the two
standards.
The Amy Travel court's assumption that the new standard was identical
to the old one conflicts with Southwest Sunsites.4 6 ° In Southwest Sunsites,
the petitioners argued against application of the Cliffdale deception stan-
dard, contending that applying that standard violated section 5 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA).4 6 ' They noted that the APA required
parties to be "timely informed of . . the matters of fact and law as-
serted., 462 The petitioners also claimed that their due process rights were
violated because the FTC "'based its decision on a new theory of decep-
tion that was significantly different from the one litigated by the par-
ties. '463 The court found that "[e]ach of the three elements of the new
standard challenged by petitioner impose[d] a greater burden of proof on
the FTC to show a violation of Section 5."464 The court then explained
how the new standard differed from the old one. In the present case, the
court pointed out that "[t]he Commission reversed the AL's findings on
a theory more narrow than, but completely subsumed in, the prior theory.
All evidence relevant to the old theory was necessarily relevant to the
new." 465 The court, therefore, rejected the petitioners' argument that
they had been subject to a different standard without opportunity to
respond.
It is important to understand the basis upon which the court rejected
the petitioners' claim that the FTC should not be able to apply its new
standards without complying with the APA. That argument was rejected
because the petitioners were not harmed by application of the new stan-
dard, which made it even harder for the FTC to prove a violation.466
459. See id. at *41-42.
460. See Southwest Sunsites, 785 F.2d at 1436.
461. See id. at 1435.
462. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (1994).
463. Southwest Sunsites, 785 F.2d at 1435.
464. Id. at 1436.
465. Id.
466. The court's conclusion in Southwest Sunsites was misconstrued in subsequent cases
such as Amy Travel, which interpreted Southwest Sunsites as finding that both the new and
old standards were identical. Amy Travel, No. 87-C 6776, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13371
(N.D. I11. Feb. 10, 1988).
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The Tenth Circuit clarified the status of the 1983 policy statement in
Amrep Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission. 467 The court ruled that be-
cause the 1983 policy statement was not the result of formal rulemaking
or adjudication, it had no binding effect and was comparable to a press
release.46s The case before the Commission in Amrep was decided after
the Commission issued the 1983 policy statement, but before it adopted
that statement in the Cliffdale case. Therefore, the Amrep court held that
the Commission was correct in applying the old deception standard.469
The court seemed implicitly to accept Amrep's argument that the policy
statement represented a new deception standard, but nevertheless held
that the Commission was not bound by the new standard.47 °
VIII. EVALUATING MILLER: OBJECTIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
At his confirmation hearing and early in his chairmanship at the FTC,
Miller stated several objectives that he hoped to achieve at the FTC.
These objectives included providing strong leadership for the Comnis-
sion, increasing the use of economic analysis in determining the Commis-
sion's activities, improving the advertising substantiation program,
reducing rulemaking, and reforming the FTC's approach to adjudicating
cases. In light of the previously mentioned description of FTC activities
under Miller, it is possible to evaluate Miller's success in reaching those
objectives.471 While there were some failures, Miller was able to depart
with a legacy that has influenced the FTC up to the present.
A. A Strong Leader
From the first days of his administration, Miller demonstrated that he
intended to follow a strong chairman model in running the FTC.4 72 His
objective was to be an aggressive leader, both internally in order to direct
the FTC down a new path, and externally in order to improve the Com-
mission's relations with business and Congress. Miller exhibited strong
leadership by placing persons who enthusiastically supported his objec-
tives in top management positions, thus enabling Miller to successfully
redirect the agency. As a testament to Miller's success in this area, many
467. 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985).
468. See id. at 1178.
469. See id
470. See id.
471. This section evaluates Miller's performance by comparing his objectives with his
achievements. This is different than evaluating the work of the FTC itself. The latter type
of evaluation poses many difficult conceptual problems. See generally GLEN 0. ROBIN-
SON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 83-84 (1991).
472. See supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
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staff members who disagreed with the redirection resigned from the
agency.473 Moreover, many of the staff that remained were isolated from
the Chairman and top management.474
The reactions of the staff that Miller inherited did not prove that he
was an unsuccessful internal manager. His stated goals did not include
fostering a congenial working relationship between the staff and the
chairman. Even if his internal management policies resulted in exper-
ienced and talented staff resigning and decreased morale and effective-
ness among remaining staff, this was consistent with Miller's goal of "an
overall reduction in staff activity.,
475
In addition to poor relations with many staff members, Miller had
strained relations with two members of the Commission, namely Pert-
schuk and Bailey, a situation that impeded many Commission initiatives.
This did not, however, reflect a failure in achieving his goals because
Miller's goals did not include encouraging collegiality between commis-
sioners and the chairman.
Another goal was to improve the Commission's relationship with busi-
ness.4 76 Miller was successful in achieving this goal. In contrast to the
period from 1969 until he took office, Miller established a non-adversarial
relationship with the business community.477 He was able to improve the
Commission's relations with business in several ways. He adopted poli-
cies that were more consistent with the wishes of the business community.
For example, he advocated narrower definitions of deceptive practices,
pushed for the closure of several regional offices, and stopped the pro-
gress of many rulemaking proceedings. In addition, instead of attempting
to impose the FTC's requirements upon businesses through adjudication,
he was able to reach voluntary compliance settlements with businesses.
These settlements reflected a compromise between industry desires and
Commission requests.478
Another stated goal was to improve relations between Congress and
the Commission. Miller failed to achieve this goal. Whether Congress
was controlled by Democrats or Republicans, Miller was unable to
achieve legislative victories, and had a hostile relationship with congres-
sional oversight committees during much of his tenure. This was a major
failure in his leadership, given Congress's crucial role in implementing his
objectives, such as codifying the definitions of unfair and deceptive, as
473. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at 199.
474. See id.
475. Id. at 199-200.
476. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
477. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at 206.
478. See supra notes 414-18 and accompanying text.
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well as the vital role that Congress played in determining the budget, di-
rection, and fate of the FTC.
B. Increased Use of Economic Analysis in FTC Policies and Practices
The second Miller objective was to impose economic analysis, espe-
cially cost-benefit analysis, upon the Commission's activities. Miller char-
acterized many of those who opposed cost-benefit analysis as appearing
"carried away by a feverish moralism that disdained rational analysis;" he
expressed concern that "[w]ithout some check .... regulatory decision
makers may be tempted to pander to such moralism-or to other special
interests. '479 Miller was successful in requiring economic justification for
agency activity by significantly increasing the role of the Bureau of Eco-
nomics.48° Under Miller, the Bureau of Economics assigned an econo-
mist to each rulemaking proceeding and conducted a cost-benefit impact
study for each rule. Not only did the injection of Miller's style of eco-
nomic analysis lead to the termination and suspension of many rules, but
it also halted the types of initiatives started under Pertschuk.48 1 Further-
more, the imposition of economic analysis was another factor which led
to the improvement of relations between the Commission and the busi-
482ness community.
C. Improvement of the Advertising Substantiation Program
The third Miller objective was to significantly change the Commission's
advertising substantiation program. As Miller himself admitted, the
Commission's three year study of the program was unsatisfactory. Miller
did not receive the support and information he requested from industry,
and he disagreed with some of the substantive aspects of the FTC's re-
vised policy statement.48 3 Clearly, he did not meet his objectives for this
program.
D. Reduction in Rulemaking
Miller's fourth objective was to reduce the Commission's rulemaking
activity. He was very successful in this regard, however, it is important to
keep in mind certain facts. First, the extensive rulemaking agenda that
Miller inherited was not the result of feverish activity on the part of the
Pertschuk Commission. Rather, most of these rules were initiated in pre-
479. MILLER, supra note 7, at 91.
480. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at 203.
481. See id.
482. See id.
483. See supra notes 301-09 and accompanying text.
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vious Republican administrations. 4 Second, it must be noted that a few
significant rules were approved during the Miller years.485 Third, despite
vigorous opposition from organized professionals, Miller fought hard to
insure that these professionals would remain under the jurisdiction of the
FTC and subject to Commission rulemaking. 86 Although this was an im-
portant victory, it conflicted with his overall objective to reduce
rulemaking.
E. Adjudication Reform
A fifth Miller objective was to reform the FTC's method of adjudicat-
ing cases. Miller did not want the Commission to develop any new theo-
ries. Instead, he wanted the FTC to adopt a common law approach. In
addition, he hoped that Congress would codify a new legislative defini-
tion of deception for the FTC to apply in its cases. Although Congress
refused to do this, the Commission formulated and adopted a new defini-
tion of deception. 87 Instead of developing novel theories to impose
upon businesses, the FTC favored cooperation and compromise in its
cases against businesses. 488 Thus, Miller was successful in achieving his
objectives regarding the FTC's approach to adjudication.
F Miller's Legacy
In light of the above discussion, it is appropriate to consider what sort
of legacy Miller's administration left to the FTC. In the area of rulemak-
ing, Miller seems to have left a lasting imprint. Since his departure, the
FTC has not engaged in new rulemaking initiatives. 48 9 It must be
remembered, however, that there had been considerable congressional
pressure upon the FTC to restrain its rulemaking activities even before
Miller became chairman.490 Moreover, rather than terminating most
rulemaking proceedings, Miller succeeded only in stalling their progress.
484. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at 190.
485. See supra notes 388-98 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the
Credit Practices Rule).
486. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at 190, 206.
487. See, e.g., In re Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 818 (1984); In re Cliffdale
Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984).
488. See supra notes 476-78 and accompanying text.
489. The FTC has promulgated rules pursuant to specific legislative directives rather
than identifying areas on its own. See, e.g., Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 310
(1996) (regulating telemarketing pursuant to the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Prevention Act); Labeling Requirements for Alternative Fuels and Alternative Fu-
eled Vehicles, 60 Fed. Reg. 26,926 (1995) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 309) (establishing
uniform labelling requirements pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992).
490. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at 190-93.
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As a result, the chairman who succeeded Miller could have aggressively
pushed ahead for enactment of those rules. Although this did not occur,
Miller's failure to terminate the proceedings left open that possibility.49'
Finally, the FTC's policy statement redefining deception has endured.
Many cases have adopted the new standard without extensive discussion
or criticism.492 This lack of critical discussion is notable because several
courts, despite Miller's protestations to the contrary, have recognized that
the policy statement reflects, not a mere restatement of the old standard,
but a "new standard, 493 or a "new interpretation. 494 Most federal
courts, however, have not yet decided whether, or to what extent, the
policy statement should be adopted. Moreover, in Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Pantron I Corp., the Ninth Circuit, while adopting those por-
tions of the policy statement which applied to the case before it, was
careful to note that it was not voicing any opinion on the appropriateness
of the standard regarding issues not before the court.495 In fact, the court
noted Commissioner Pertschuk's disagreement with the deception policy
statement in regard to those issues which were not before the court. Nev-
ertheless, the redefinition of deception in the policy statement has had a
lasting effect on both FTC adjudication and cases heard by the federal
courts.
IX. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Miller's administration of the FTC raises many important policy issues.
Exploring these issues within the framework of various theories related
to administrative agencies offers insight into the significance of Miller's
chairmanship.
491. See id. at 210.
492. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794 (1995); Kraft, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 970 F.2d
311, 321-24 (7th Cir. 1992); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Patriot Alcohol Testers, Inc., 798 F.
Supp. 851, 855 (D. Mass. 1992); Federal Trade Comm'n v. US Sales Corp., 785 F. Supp.
737, 748-49 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Federal Trade Comm'n v. National Bus. Consultants, 781 F.
Supp. 1136,1142 (E.D. La. 1991); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Atlantex Assocs., No. 87-0045-
CIV-NESBITT, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10911, at *24-25 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 1987); Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Rocky Mountain Circulation, No. 86-F-798, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15935, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 1987).
493. See Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 n.2
(9th Cir. 1986).
494. State ex rel. Nixon v. Telco Directory Publ'g, 863 S.W.2d 596, 604 (Mo. 1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring in result in part and concurring in part); see also Amrep Corp. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1985) (implicitly recognizing the
deception policy statement as the new interpretation by refusing to apply it in a case which
arose before the policy statement had been formally adopted in an FTC adjudication).
495. See Pantron 1, 33 F.3d at 1095-96.
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A perennial issue in the study of administrative agencies is whether
agency performance would improve if an agency were converted from the
commission model to a single administrator. Those who favor such a
change believe that, under a single administrator, an agency would have
stronger leadership, accountability, direction, and coordination.
49 6 If
Miller did not have to contend with opposition from Pertschuk and Bai-
ley, he could have more effectively and efficiently carried out his pro-
gram. 97 A single administrator could implement the President's
program without obstruction. In the case of the FTC, however, an unre-
strained, strong and aggressive leadership by a single administrator prob-
ably would have been met by an equally strong reaction from Congress.
For instance, Congress traditionally has wavered between supporting the
FTC's consumer protection agenda and then, when finding that the FTC
went too far, seeking to cut back on the FTC's activities.498 The commis-
sion model seems to offer some insulation from congressional attack. Be-
cause the members of the Commission represent both political parties as
well as one independent, it at least has the appearance of impartiality,
resulting in less political pressure. 99
There is some question, moreover, whether a single administrator
would carry out the policies of the President who appointed him, or his
own personal agenda. Often the administration has no particular policy
position on many of the issues that come before an agency.5"' Miller
complained that he received little direction from the President and, at
times, was accountable to no one.50 1 The commission model avoids the
possibility of excesses by a single administrator who lacks strong direction
from the administration that appointed him.
The commission model offers other advantages as well. If there is a
single administrator, transition from one administrator to the next may be
difficult, especially if the new administrator has a substantially different
style and philosophy. In contrast, the commission system, with its stag-
gered appointments, provides the potential for stability and continuity.
In addition, those who have been in office for some time can develop
496. See WELBORN, supra note 5, at 148.
497. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988
DUKE L.J. 257. Professor Verkuil proposes that a commission should handle an agency's
adjudicatory functions, while a single administrator should be responsible for rulemaking.
See id. at 267. Professor Miller fears such an administrator's relative lack of accountability.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate Over Independent Agencies in Light of
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 221.
498. See HARRIS & MILKIs, supra note 2, at 194-95.
499. See WELBORN, supra note 5, at 7.
500. See id. at 146.
501. See Independent Agencies, supra note 400, at 502.
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expertise.5 °2 Moreover, the quality of the agency's work presumably is
improved when it is the product of several commissioners who approach
problems from different perspectives. 50 3 While a single administrator
could operate more efficiently, the collegial decisionmaking of a biparti-
san commission is structured to produce better programs that are "con-
sensual, reflective and pluralistic.., shared opinions rather than decisive
ukases ... more concerned with the values of fairness, acceptability and
accuracy than with the single dimension of efficiency.
504
Despite the theoretical advantages of the commission model over the
single administrator model, the situation at the FTC during the Miller
years indicates that there are significant disadvantages to the commission
system when there is a bitter and hostile split between the chairman and
the commissioners. One such split occurred because of the opposition of
Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey. Professor David Welborn's re-
search finds, however, that this situation was unusual. Such conflict and
confrontation between the chairman and the members of the commission
does not ordinarily occur 50 5 because the chairman and the members of a
commission usually do not remain at the agency long enough to develop
vested interests and a strong allegiance to certain issues, which is neces-
sary before a member is willing to confront another commissioner.50 6 On
the other hand, where one person is chairman for an extended period and
several of the commissioners also remain at the agency for a substantial
period, there is more potential for conflict to develop.50 7
Professor Welborn found that conflict generally does not arise even
when a chairman effectuates changes in the agency unless the members of
the commission perceive the changes "as diminishing their place in the
agency."50 8 Commission members typically are not disturbed by a chair-
man who increases his or her role. Rather, commission members become
upset when staff members are felt to be impinging upon their roles.50 9
Conflict between the chairman and members of the commission, there-
fore, is not expected and can be avoided by a spirit of collegiality. Profes-
sor Welborn found that the "[c]ollegiality requires a certain civility
toward colleagues."51 0 The chairman can promote collegiality and avoid
502. See WELBORN, supra note 5, at 7.
503. See id.
504. Verkuil, supra note 497, at 260-61.
505. See WELBORN, supra note 5, at 135.
506. See id. at 136.
507. See id.
508. Id. at 134.
509. See id.
510. Id. at 135.
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conflict and confrontation by acknowledging that each member has a val-
uable contribution to make, by informing the members of what the chair-
man intends to do, and by allowing the members to participate in the
work of the agency. Style is important: "consult and do not demean. 5 1'
If the chairman acts in this way, the members will trust the chairman and
allow him or her "considerable discretion." '512 These lessons, gleaned
from studying several federal regulatory agencies, suggest that Chairman
Miller could have succeeded in developing a productive working relation-
ship with Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey. Even if this was not pos-
sible, Professor Welborn's research suggests that the problem which arose
under Miller's leadership of the FTC is not typical, and, therefore, the
conflict at the FTC should not be used as an argument to abolish the
commission system and replace it with a single administrator.
The nature of the working relationship among FTC commissioners in
recent years provides further evidence that the antagonism which ham-
pered the agency's operation under Miller was related to the personalities
involved, rather than the commission structure. No longer do FTC opin-
ions frequently contain dissenting opinions revealing deep ideological
splits among commission members.513 Commissioner Christine Varney
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. The consumer cases from 1986 to 1992 contain few dissenting opinions. When
there is a dissent, the dissenting commissioner often concurred in a substantial portion of
the majority's handling of the case, but would have gone somewhat further in providing
sanctions against the respondent company. Often commissioners did not dissent, but pub-
lished separate statements to express their individual perspective on an issue or to suggest
an alternative approach. See e.g., In re Sandoz Nutrition Corp., 115 F.T.C. 741, 759 (1992)
(Owen concurring in part, dissenting in part) (questioning the efficacy of disclosures on
television and radio ads); In re National Center For Nutrition, 115 F.T.C. 722, 736 (1992)
(Azcuenaga, concurring) (cautioning that unlike the repondent's claims, other diet compa-
nies' claims may be valid; therefore, their ads would not be subject to the same require-
ments the F.T.C. had imposed upon respondent); In re Sun Company, 115 F.T.C. 560, 569,
571 (1992) (Owen, dissenting) (favoring a stronger remedy); Id. at 571 (Yao, concurring)
(suggesting consumer education would be beneficial in addition to the majority's remedy);
In re CPC Int'l Inc., 114 F.T.C. 1, 9 (1991) (Owen, dissenting in part, concurring in part)
(calling for more empirical evidence showing how consumers interpreted the respondent's
ads); In re Guild Mortgage Co., 113 F.T.C. 1183, 1201 (1990) (Strenio, dissenting) (favoring
a stronger remedy); In re Budget Rent A Car Corp., 113 F.T.C. 1109, 1114 (1990)
(Azcuenaga, concurring) (favoring an additional disclosure requirement); In re Jeep Eagle
Corp., 113 F.T.C. 792, 803 (1990) (Azcuenaga, separate statement) (opining that there was
no reason to believe a violation of law occurred); In re Heilig-Myers Co., 112 F.T.C. 579,
584-85 (1989) (Strenio, dissenting) (believing majority's remedy was too lenient); In re Silo,
Inc., 112 F.T.C. 175, 178 (1989) (Strenio, dissenting) (demanding injunction as well as ma-
jority's civil penalty); In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 584, 589 (1989) (Oliver,
separate statement) (favoring court enforcement, not majority's order to show cause); In re
General Nutrition, Inc., 111 F.T.C. 387, 416 (1989) (Azcuenaga, dissenting) (favoring rem-
edy which would go further in restricting respondent's conduct); In re Removatron Int'l
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has pointed out that the FTC's current approach can be characterized as
problem solving. Most decisions now are unanimous and the Commision
operates in a bipartisan fashion.514 When the Commission considers
whether to issue regulations and the content of those regulations, they
meet with industry, consumers, and state attorneys general in order to
determine how best to proceed.5 15 Varney attributes the collegial atmos-
phere in which commissioners work to the leadership of the present and
immediate past chairmen.516
Critics have charged that the regulators are often "captured" by the
industry they are supposed to be regulating.51 7 Critics of Miller could
point to several factors indicating that the FTC was held captive by indus-
try during the Miller years. For example, Miller himself said at the com-
mencement of his administration that he wanted to halt what he
perceived as the adversarial relationship between the FTC and busi-
nesses. In addition, his actions indicated a willingness to take the FTC in
directions favorable to industry. Industry opposed comprehensive and
widespread rulemaking; Miller also opposed such rulemaking and, as we
Corp., 111 F.T.C. 206, 312 (1988) (Azcuenaga, concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(favoring substantiation by two clinical tests rather than the majority's one required test);
Id. at 317 (Strenio, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (favoring substantiation by two
clinical tests rather than the majority's one required test); In re Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc., 111 F.T.C. 1, 23 (1988) (Oliver, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (favoring modi-
fication of more of original order than majority); Id. at 25 (Calvani, dissenting) (disagree-
ing with majority on modification of one paragraph of the order); Id. (Azcuenaga,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (favoring modifying one more paragraph than
majority); In re Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 620
(1988) (Strenio, concurring) (concurring in regard to majority's finding of unfair acts or
practices; favoring not reaching issue of unfair methods of competition); In re Ogilvy &
Mather Int'l, 110 F.T.C. 528, 538-40 (1988) (Oliver, concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(objecting to treating ad agency more harshly than its client); In re Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 110 F.T.C. 392, 474 (1988) (Oliver, concurring) (objecting to active government super-
vision of arbitration proceeding over extended period of time); In re McCoy Industries, 109
F.T.C. 101, 115 (1987) (Strenio, dissenting) (favoring inclusion of monetary redress as well
as cease and desist order); In re C & D Elec., Inc., 109 F.T.C. 72, 78 (1987) (Azcuenaga,
dissenting) (opining that consent agreement was in reality an attempt by Commission to
stop unlawful conduct by consumers); In re Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 372
(1986) (Oliver, separate statement) (concurring in order, but disagreeing with its applica-
tion of the unfairness standard to facts of case); Id. at 380-81 (Calvani & Strenio, concur-
ring) (favoring restitution as well as majority's cease and desist order).
514. Remarks of Commissioner Christine Varney before the Consumer Financial Serv-
ices Committee, Business Law Section, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Or-
lando, Florida (Aug. 3, 1996) (on file with author).
515. See id.
516. Interview with Commissioner Christine Varney, Orlando, Florida (Aug. 3, 1996)
(on file with author).
517. See JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 102 (1978).
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have seen, stopped the forward movement of most rulemaking proceed-
ings. In addition, Miller preferred compromise and voluntary compliance
in adjudicatory proceedings. Most importantly, Miller's fundamental
economic philosophy was consistent with industry preference for substan-
tial deregulation. Miller believed "that economic efficiency and a com-
petitive marketplace were equivalent to the interests of consumers.-5 18
Richard Harris and Sidney Milkis, however, believe that it is "mislead-
ing" to regard these factors as proof that the FTC was captured by busi-
ness interests.519 They cite as proof Miller's strong opposition to the
movement, led by the American Medical Association, to amend the FrC
Act to exempt the commercial activity of professions from FTC jurisdic-
tion.52° In fact, before becoming Chairman of the FTC, Miller headed
the Reagan transition team which reported to the President what reforms
were needed at the FTC. The transition report supported the FTC's ef-
forts to prevent trade restraints by the professions.521 According to the
transition report, the professions acted as if they were guilds.522 Miller
feared that if the professions were allowed to engage in self-regulation
absent Commission jurisdiction, they would engage in anti-competitive
practices.523
Harris and Milkis may, however, go too far in claiming that Miller's
opposition to an exemption for the professions proves that the agency
was not captured by business interests. At most, it simply may prove that
Miller opposed exempting certain businesses from FTC jurisdiction while
retaining others under its jurisdiction. It may demonstrate that, although
Miller was not captured by the particular professional associations seek-
ing exemption, he was captured by others. Even assuming that Miller's
opposition to exempting the professions means that the FTC was not
"captured" by industry as that term is generally understood, and further
assuming that Miller's economic philosophy rather than pressure from
business motivated his actions, it is nevertheless clear that, for the most
part, Miller's policies coincided with those favored by the business com-
munity. At the very least, this leads to the perception that the FTC was
captured by industry. That perception likely led Congress and consumer
groups to presume automatically that any FTC action during the Miller
years would favor business.
518. HARRIS & MiLKIS, supra note 2, at 188.
519. See id. at 206.
520. See id.
521. See id. at 206-07.
522. See id. at 190.
523. See id.
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The experience of the FTC under Chairman Miller also has implica-
tions for the FTC's status as an independent agency. The threshold ques-
tion which arises in considering this issue is determining from whom the
,FTC should be independent. It is generally understood that Congress
established the FTC and similar agencies separate from executive branch
agencies and cabinet departments so that they may be independent of
presidential control.524 Miller, in contrast, believed that the agency
should be restructured so that it was independent of Congress. Miller
claimed that Congress dominated the independent agencies.525 He stated
that the President "should have complete authority to direct the in-
dependent agencies, 526 thus affording the agency protection from "'hits'
by members of Congress and the media. 5 27 In addition to the independ-
ent agencies' vulnerability to Congress, Miller criticized the status of in-
dependent agencies because it seemingly omitted accountability
overall.528 Because of these deficiencies, Miller felt that "the indepen-
dence of independent agencies [was] a bad idea.
529
The experience of the FTC under Miller provided many examples of
congressional interference with Miller's attempt to run the agency.
Miller's ability to carry out administration policies would have been sim-
plified greatly had Congress not interfered so extensively. Miller's propo-
sal that he be accountable to the President instead of to Congress,
however, was unrealistic. Congress passes legislation that defines the
FTC's authority, and is the only body that can appropriate money to run
the agency. The FTC's history indicates that Congress would never grant
the agency carte blanche to carry out the President's wishes using the
money Congress appropriated. Although Miller believed the President
should have the sole authority to direct agencies such as the FTC, he also
complained that the agency did not receive much guidance from the Pres-
524. See Geoffrey P. Miller, supra note 497, at 217; Aulana L. Peters, Independent
Agencies: Government's Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 286, 290-91.
525. See Independent Agencies, supra note 400, at 504. Some in Congress have re-
garded the independent agencies as "'arms of Congress."' Verkuil, supra note 497, at 259.
For a criticism of the "arm of Congress" viewpoint, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent
Agencies, 1986 Sup. Or. REv. 41, 64. A study of the FTC from 1966 to 1979 found that the
FTC was influenced by Congress's oversight subcommittee. See generally Barry R. Wein-
gast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Poli-
cymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
526. Independent Agencies, supra note 400, at 505.
527. Id. at 503.
528. See id. at 502.
529. Id.
1997]
Catholic University Law Review
ident.53° If the FTC were truly independent of Congress and subject only
to a President who provided no supervision, then the FTC would be ac-
countable to no one-a situation which Miller deplored.53'
Another problem with Miller's proposed solution is that if the FTC
were protected from congressional oversight or pressure, Congress would
be able to act only in the most heavy-handed manner by either slashing
the FTC's budget or enacting drastic statutory changes in the FTC's au-
thority. Furthermore, to the extent the FTC truly might be insulated
from Congress and ignored by the executive branch, the FTC would be at
liberty to adopt extremist policies free from the moderating influences of
the political process. There is no question that the present structure sub-
jects the FTC to substantial pressure from Congress. Unfortunately, this
greatly complicates the work of the FTC for Congress itself cannot always
determine what role it wants the FTC to take.532 Miller's solution, how-
ever, creates its own set of problems.
The FTC under Miller also provides a framework for considering pub-
lic choice theory under which regulators are presumed to act in their self-
interest.533 According to this theory, regulators also seek to create sound
public policy and act in a manner not antagonistic to powerful
legislators.5
34
Professor Peter Letsou applies public choice theory to the FTC's
Credit Practices Rule, which was adopted in 1984. According to this the-
ory, policymakers "sell regulation to the highest bidders. '535 The groups
who usually win regulatory "auctions" are "those with the lowest organi-
zational costs, generally those with relatively few members, but with large
per capita stakes in the outcome of the regulatory battle., 536 Professor
Letsou identifies groups that would benefit from the Credit Practices
530. See id. at 504. Joseph Grundfest, former member of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, also noted that, as a Commissioner, almost all of the feedback he received
was from Congress and very little was from the executive branch. Id. at 506-07.
531. See id. at 502.
532. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at 194-95.
533. See Letsou, supra note 20, at 624. This simplistic theory of human behavior has
been subject to criticism. For example, if agency officials share the same behavioral char-
acteristics as the rest of us, "we must assume an indeterminate range of preference order-
ings. How, then, can we predict what choices a bureaucrat will make?" ROBINSON, supra
note 471, at 84-85. "The assumption that the dominant incentive of public officials is pri-
vate gain smacks of a naive cynicism .... This assumption is not only a caricature; to the
extent it gains currency, it threatens to undermine the norms that sustain public spirit."
Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade
Commission, 68 B.U. L. REv. 349, 401 (1988).
534. See Letsou, supra note 20, at 651.
535. Id. at 627.
536. Id. at 627-28.
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Rule. One group is legal aid organizations, which benefit because the
rule "both increase[s] the level of job satisfaction enjoyed by legal aid
attorneys and help[s] legal aid organizations demonstrate the value of
their services to those who provide the funding necessary to continue and
expand legal aid services to the poor. '5 3 7 The other group which would
be a successful bidder at the regulatory auction are banks and other non-
finance company lenders.538 According to Professor Letsou, the restric-
tions imposed by the Credit Practices Rule impact mainly consumer fi-
nance companies, which rely on remedies such as wage assignments and
security interests in household goods.539 Other types of lenders, there-
fore, favor the rule because they compete with finance companies.5 n In
addition, the FTC itself favors the rule because it gives them "substantial
administrative powers."'54 ' Another public choice advocate, William Nis-
kanen, adds that because regulators act in a self-interested, utility maxi-
mizing manner, they favor actions which will justify increasing their
budget.542 Professor Letsou acknowledges that regulators, in addition to
adopting regulations which increase their power and prestige, also desire
to adopt regulations which are good public policy. Niskanen agrees, but
claims regulators are unable to implement good public policy because of
bureaucratic constraints.543
Professor Letsou argues that often regulators enact rules that actually
harm consumer welfare. According to Letsou, regulators did this in en-
acting the Credit Practices Rule, by paying too much attention to the
"losses suffered by defaulting borrowers when property from their ex-
isting endowments is seized and sold by lenders exercising coercive reme-
dies," and undervaluing the "expectational benefits enjoyed by non-
defaulting borrowers."' 5 " In other words, the Credit Practices Rule, ac-
cording to Professor Letsou, actually hurt most consumers because, by
depriving finance companies of their coercive remedies, interest rates in-
creased for all consumers. Professor Letsou also points out that the staff
were strong advocates of the rule for twelve years and maintains that
537. Id. at 630.
538. See id.
539. See id. at 632-33.
540. See id. at 631. Actually, the following trade associations formally opposed the
rule: the American Bankers Association, the American Retail Federation, the National
Retail Merchants Association, the National Automobile Dealers Association, and the
American Financial Services Association. Only the latter represented finance companies.
See Clanton Holds Swing Vote, supra note 391, at 1117-18.
541. Letsou, supra note 20, at 637.
542. See ROBINSON, supra note 471, at 85 (summarizing WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, Bu-
REAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38-39 (1971)).
543. See id.
544. Letsou, supra note 20, at 657.
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FTC implementation of the Credit Practices Rule increased the authority
of the agency.
545
Consideration of the internal environment at the FTC when the Credit
Practices Rule was adopted casts doubt on the ability of public choice
theory to adequately explain events at the FTC during the Miller years.
Letsou seems to assume that the FTC staff had the power to push through
the rule, regardless of which chairman presided during the twelve years
the rule was being formulated. Under Miller, however, the staff was
stripped of its influence, and FTC rulemaking was subject to Chairman
Miller's control. Moreover, Miller appointed management personnel
who carried out his wishes, regardless of the staff's plans.
Professor Letsou also includes legal aid organizations as an important
factor in securing enactment of the Credit Practices Rule. 46 The efforts
of the legal aid organizations were facilitated greatly because the FTC
provided funds for some of these organizations through its Intervenor
Funding program.5 47 What Letsou ignores, however, is that once Miller
became chairman, the friendly reception which legal aid organizations
had received under Pertschuk's administration ceased, and Miller pro-
posed that Congress repeal the Intervenor Funding provision.548 In addi-
tion, Letsou's assertion that non-finance companies favored the rule is
incorrect. In fact, they actively opposed the rule.549 Finally, Letsou
545. Id. at 655. Professor Letsou stated that:
Both sources of power and prestige appear to be important in explaining the
adoption by the FTC of its Credit Practices Rule. The Credit Practices Rule
clearly expanded the power and prestige of the FTC. As the agency charged with
enforcing the rule, the FTC acquired expansive new powers over the consumer
lending industry when the rule was adopted. Thus, it should not be surprising that
the FTC staff vigorously promoted the Credit Practices Rule over a twelve year
period encompassing the administrations of four presidents with very different
ideological agendas-Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Richard L. Peterson, Rewriting Consumer Contracts: Cred-
itor's Remedies, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULA-
TION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR 184, 200-03 (Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J.
Muris eds., 1981) (discussing the increase in FTC regulatory authority under the Trade
Regulation Rule on Creditors' Remedies).
546. See Lestou, supra note 20, at 631.
547. See Report of the Presiding Officer on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule: Credit
Practices, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,197 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 444).
548. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 2, at 205. The Intervenor funding provision was
repealed in 1994 P.L. 103-312. Professor Braucher has described the inferior position of
legal aid organizations participating in the proceedings as "less organized and less well-
financed" and that generally "the benefits of regulation often are harder to identify and
quantify than the costs." Braucher, supra note 533, at 403. The numbers of comments
submitted by creditor representatives "vastly outnumbered" those submitted by consumer
representatives. Id.
549. See supra note 540.
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claims that the FTC adopted the Credit Practices Rule to expand the
power and prestige of the agency. °
This application of public choice theory ignores several important fac-
tors. As we have seen, Miller's fundamental approach to consumer pro-
tection was to permit the marketplace to operate free of government
intervention. Miller did not want to increase the power of the FTC. The
theory also fails to consider several of the factors which led to enactment
of the rule. Time, political pressure, negotiation, and compromise all
played roles.5 51 The structure of the FTC as an independent agency with
a bipartisan multi-member commission whose members serve for stag-
gered terms, provided a collegial, give-and-take institutional structure
which resulted in the final rule.
Even assuming regulators act primarily in their own self-interest, such
behavior can vary greatly depending upon whose reward system the regu-
lators most value. Letsou could have modified his analysis to account for
the change which occurred when the Credit Practices Rule passed from
the hands of activist-bent Pertschuk to deregulation-bent Miller. 2 Pro-
fessor Glen Robinson finds the resulting revised model based on public
choice theory unsatisfactory.
It reduces the model to the following rather unhelpful proposi-
tion: bureaucrats will seek rationally to advance their prefer-
ences in conformity with the reward system that prevails in the
political environment in which they operate; the political envi-
ronment normally (i.e., historically) has rewarded growth in out-
put, but sometimes it has not.553
Finally, the public choice model does not account for the fact that it is
difficult for officials in an agency such as the FTC to determine "the re-
ward system that prevails in the political environment in which they oper-
ate." '554 The FTC operates in an environment subject to pressure from
the President, Congress, the businesses it regulates, the media, and public
opinion. Taking action which results in rewards from one group often
results in howls of protest from one or more of the other groups. Further,
550. See Letsou, supra note 20, at 655.
551. See supra note 391-98 and accompanying text (discussing examples of political
pressure and compromise in the FTC Rulemaking process).
552. See ROBINSON, supra note 471, at 86 (stating that "bureaucratic retrenchment re-
flects a change in the external political signals that ultimately control the bureaucrat's re-
ward structure").
553. Id.; see Jerry Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and
Critical Stories of Legal Development, in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 77, 81
(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1994) (characterizing public choice theory as "a nonstarter as a basis
for constructing a good explanation of administrative process").
554. ROBINSON, supra note 471, at 86.
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the power and influence of groups vary over time.555 Some organizations
substantially change their positions on the role of the FTC. For example,
Congress both criticizes the FTC for not doing enough to combat fraud,
and imposes restraints when it decides the FTC is being too aggressive.556
Despite the tough stance he took at the commencement of his term,
Miller apparently felt the pressure of these conflicting reward systems.
Reflecting on his years at the FTC, Miller stated he would have preferred
presidential protection from Congress and the media.557 These pressures
may have played a role in Miller's willingness to compromise on the
Credit Practices Rule.
This critique of the application of public choice theory to the FTC's
Credit Practices Rule illustrates the importance of viewing law over time
and within the institutional context in which it occurs. Institutions change
over time and it is crucial to be aware of those changes both in terms of
internal management policies, the philosophy and objectives of the lead-
ers of the agency, and the outside pressures influencing the agency's ac-
tions. It is impossible to fully appreciate the significance of an agency's
actions if one applies a theory that does not adequately consider the spe-
cific structural characteristics of the institution, and the changes over
time. For a theoretical model to provide useful insights, initial assump-
tions should be relaxed or replaced "to permit the model to better ap-
proach the untidy reality in which the legal system operates.
''558
The theory of comprehensive rationality559 better reflects the approach
which Miller attempted to follow. He wanted FTC policy to be based
entirely on his view of rational, objective, empirically driven, cost-benefit
analysis. He eschewed outside influences from Congress and the public
and internal influences from career staff and commissioners with whom
he did not agree. As we have seen, however, ultimately, he found that he
could not lead the FTC in that manner. On at least certain issues, he was
forced to adopt behavior consistent with the social constructionist the-
ory,560 which stresses the influence of dynamic social interaction, and re-
sults in the accommodation of at least some congressional concerns.
555. The power and influence of both consumer and business groups have ebbed and
flowed. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discussing the fluctuation of power
in the consumer's movement).
556. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
557. See supra notes 403-04 and accompanying text (stating Chairman Miller's attitude
regarding congressional pressure).
558. Woodward, supra note 3, at 426.
559. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of comprehen-
sive rationality).
560. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing the social constructionist
theory).
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Thus, Miller's administration raised several important policy implica-
tions and provided a testing ground for various theories of administrative
agency behavior. This study of the Miller FTC allows several conclusions
about the FTC's structure and operation.
X. CONCLUSION
In section 5 of the FTC Act, Congress granted the FTC broad discre-
tion to interpret and enforce the Act by purposely not defining the unfair
and deceptive acts prohibited by the section. The terms "unfair" and "de-
ceptive" are necessarily vague to grant the FTC the flexibility needed to
proscribe the ever-changing types of schemes devised by clever and in-
ventive con artists. This study documents Miller's failures and achieve-
ments as he took advantage of that discretion to alter the direction of the
FTC's consumer protection program. Because his victories have en-
dured, an understanding of them is necessary to fully appreciate the
FTC's current activities.
In addition, Miller's term as Chairman of the FTC raises fundamental
questions about the structure and operation of the agency because he di-
rectly challenged both these elements. He wanted the FTC to be in-
dependent of Congress and converted into a department of the executive
branch. By taking actions which conflicted with commission members,
he sought to run the FTC as if he were a single administrator despite its
existing structure. He changed the standard governing enforcement pol-
icy and stalled the FTC's rulemaking activities.
Given the FTC's need for broad discretion to prohibit acts and prac-
tices, the definition of which must be left vague in order to respond effec-
tively to consumers' need for protection, the FTC's present structure is
suitable to its mission. Changing the FTC from a commission to a single
administrator, or from an independent agency to one within the executive
branch, would create a host of problems.561 Foremost, such changes
would allow the agency head to exert too much unilateral power over the
direction of the agency. A "conservative" head could force the agency to
grind to a halt, forsaking its congressionally mandated mission. Congress
could respond by enacting legislation to counter this problem, but such
statutory change requires a great deal of time and resources, and proba-
bly could not be accomplished until after that person resigned. An "ac-
tivist" head could subject industry to new comprehensive restrictions far
beyond anything justified by abuses discovered in the marketplace. In-
dustry would certainly appeal to the courts and Congress for relief, but
561. See supra notes 496-507, 524-29 and accompanying text.
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the agency's structure should not be susceptible to allowing its head to act
beyond his or her authority. As this study demonstrates, even within the
present structure, the chairman can be enormously influential. Because
of the broad discretion given the FTC, this power should be subject to the
constraints inherent in the independent agency and commission structure.
In one area, however, legislative reform is warranted. Under Miller,
the FTC significantly changed the standards by which deceptive practices
are judged. This change was implemented despite Congress's rejection of
Miller's request for comparable congressional revisions to the FTC Act.
The change was applied to cases absent any opportunity for the public,
including state officials, to formally respond prior to its issuance. The
FTC's unilateral action was in sharp contrast to its struggle to devise bet-
ter standards for advertisement substantiation, in which Miller acknowl-
edged the critical need for comment.562 The manner in which the FTC
imposed its new deception policy precluded the agency from being re-
sponsive to the public.563 It prevented the state attorneys general and the
public from presenting their views, thus alienating those with whom the
FTC should be cooperating and coordinating activities. Furthermore, the
new deception policy exacerbated divisions within the Commission. It
deprived the FTC of detailed technical market and legal analyses, as well
as independent empirical data which might have resulted in a revised en-
forcement policy satisfactory to all parties.564
The FTC Act should be amended to require the agency to provide no-
tice and an opportunity for comment prior to adopting substantive
changes in policy relating to the definition and enforcement of its author-
ity to protect consumers under section 5 of the Act. This amendment
may not always achieve its objective. If such an amendment had been in
effect during Miller's chairmanship, he would have claimed his deception
policy was not a substantive change, but merely a restatement and clarifi-
cation of current law. The adoption of this amendment, however, would
562. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (noting Chairman Miller's support for
public comment on the ad substantiation program).
563. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that
the FTC exceeded its authority when it changed an existing law that had widespread appli-
cation through adjudication rather than through rulemaking. Ford Motor Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1981). The Senate Report on the FTC Act
Amendments of 1994 rebuked the Ninth Circuit, stating that the Ford decision was "plainly
incorrect." S. Rep. No. 103-130, at 10 (1994), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776, 1785.
Regardless of whether the FTC has the power to change laws with widespread application
through adjudication, a policy issue arises as to whether the FTC should change such laws
through adjudication instead of rulemaking.
564. See supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text (describing the advantages of better
rulemaking through public notice and comment).
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have given objectors grounds upon which to appeal to the courts to com-
pel notice and comment. This statutory change would help to ensure that
the FTC is responsive to the public without unduly interfering with its
policy making process.

